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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this article is to discuss and explain why
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the trial court's charge
to the jury should be replaced by a new set of procedural rules initially
developed by a Jury Charge Task Force appointed by the Texas Su-
preme Court in 1991. As seminared, amended, and recommended for
adoption to the Texas Supreme Court by the Supreme Court Advi-
sory Committee in 1996, these proposed rules, or comparable ones,
should be promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court. Revision of the
jury charge rules is desirable because the procedures for preserving
complaints about the court's proposed charge are unsatisfactory and
inconsistent with current standards for submitting cases to juries.
More significantly, the main focus of the existing rules concerning the
methods for making charge complaints is on the technical sufficiency
of a complaint to preserve a party's complaint for appellate review,
rather than providing trial judges with reasonable guidance in fash-
ioning the jury charge. The method in which charge complaints are
presented, in whatever form, should be sufficiently specific to apprise
the trial court of the charge problem and to enable trial judges to pre-
pare proper jury charges, not merely to lay the basis for an appeal.
Reinterpretation of the existing rules during the last decade has elimi-
nated some problems, but the current rules, even as reinterpreted in a
common-sense manner, are unworkable as well as philosophically
wrongheaded.
II. THE PROCESS OF REVISION AND RECODIFICATION
On June 19, 1991, the Texas Supreme Court appointed four Task
Forces to consider changes in the rules of procedure in Texas courts:
(1) the Task Force on the Jury Charge, (2) the Task Force on Discov-
ery, (3) the Task Force on Sanctions, and (4) the Task Force on the
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Revision of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.' Three of the Task
Forces were appointed to study specific problem areas. The Task
Force on the Jury Charge was charged by the court to study, consult
with such other interested persons as may seem appropriate, and re-
port to the Supreme Court' Advisory Committee ("Advisory Commit-
tee") what changes, if any, should be made to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure governing the jury charge.2 The Task Force on Discovery
was assigned to study, consult with such other interested persons as
may seem appropriate, and report to the Advisory Committee what
changes, if any, should be made to the procedural rules governing the
scope and conduct of discovery.' The Task Force on Sanctions was
appointed to perform the same function, and report to the Advisory
Committee "as soon as practicable" concerning the procedural rules
governing the imposition of sanctions.'
The Texas Supreme Court also appointed a separate Task Force
on the Revision of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to study, con-
sult with such other interested persons as may seem appropriate, and
report directly to the court as soon as practicable whether those rules
should be recodified into a more coherent and easily usable body, ei-
ther with or without substantive changes
Each of the special purpose Task Forces completed their assigned
work and reported their conclusions to the Advisory Committee
within a few years of their respective appointments. The Jury Charge
Task Force was the first to complete its written report, which was
submitted in April, 1993.6 The Task Force on the Revision of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure completed and submitted a detailed
1. See Appointment of Task Forces to Consider Changes in the Rules of Procedure
in Texas Courts. Misc. Docket No. 91-0048:
2. See id. *The following persons were appointed to the Jury Charge Task Force:
The Honorable Ann Tyrrell Cochran, Chairman, George W. Bramblett, Jr., Michael A.
Hatchell, Daniel K. Hedges, P. Michael Jung, John G. Lewis, Richard R. Orsinger, Jorge
C. Rangel, and Paula Sweeney).
3. See id. (The following persons were appointed to the Task Force on Discovery:
David W. Keltner, Chairman, Paul N. Gold, Mark L. Kincaid, The Honorable Bonnie
Leggat, James W. McCartney, David L. Perry, William Powers, Jr., Dan R. Price, Eduardo
R. Rodriguez, James B. Sales, and Jonathan W. Vickery).
4. Id. (The following persons were appointed to the Task Force on Sanctions:
Charles F. Herring, Jr., Chairman, Lisa Blue, Herbert Boyland, The Honorable Scott A.
Brister, Carlyle H. Chapman, Jr., Elizabeth A. Crabb, Russell H. McMains, Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, and Robert A. Valadez)
5. See id. (The following persons were appointed to the Task Force on Revision of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure: William V. Dorsaneo, III, Chairman, Alexandra W.
Albright, James W. Cannon, Jr., David E. Chamberlain, John C. Chambers, Fred Hagans,
The Honorable Lynn N. Hughes, David Lopez, and Linda Turley).
6. See App. A.
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written report to the Texas Supreme Court on November 8, 1993. 7
The chairpersons of each task force presented the recommendations
contained in the written reports at the November 1993 meeting of the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee.8 Thereafter, the Advisory
Committee met every other month until it substantially completed an
entirely new draft of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure-the "Re-
codification Draft"-in late 1997.9
On June 5, 1995, the Advisory Committee submitted its own "fi-
nal" jury charge report to the Texas Supreme Court."° On May 6,
1996, Lee Parsley, Rules Staff Attorney for the Court, returned the
jury charge rules as revised by the court to the Advisory Committee.'
As reflected in correspondence dated May 27, 1996, directed to the
court by Luther H. Soules, III, Chairman of the Advisory Committee,
the committee reviewed and discussed the court's revisions and rec-
ommended two changes to the court's draft rules. The committee's
draft jury charge rules were incorporated into the Recodification
Draft,'3 where they remain and await further action.
7. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Southern Methodist University School of Law (vis-
ited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://www.smu.edu/-wdorsane>. The Task Force on the Revision of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure reported that wholesale recodification of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure was feasible and desirable, and recommended the ultimate adop-
tion of an entirely new rulebook. See id.
8. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, November 20, 1993, at
10-626.
9. The Recodification Draft incorporates the work product of the special purpose
Task Forces as reviewed, revised, rejected, or replaced by the Advisory Committee's own
reports from the date of their submission through the end of 1997, when the Advisory
Committee disbanded. See App: E. The "Recodification Draft," as reported to the court
in late 1997, is also located on Professor Dorsaneo's website. See William V. Dorsaneo,
III, Southern Methodist University School of Law (visited Apr. 12, 2000)
<http://www.smu.edu/-wdorsane>. After a two-year hiatus, during which the court func-
tioned without a formally constituted Supreme Court Advisory Committee, a new commit-
tee was appointed in late 1999. Unfortunately, the court's own efforts to revise the proce-
dural rulebook met with substantial political opposition by legislators who were annoyed
by the court's adoption of a revised set of Discovery Rules in late 1998 while the Legisla-
ture was not in session. This opposition has made the court more circumspect and has
placed the Recodification Draft in political limbo.
10. See App. B.
11. See App. C.
12. See App. D. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee suggested eliminating the
comment to Rule 278 and changed the last sentence of Rule 278(a) to read: "Failure to
comply with this paragraph shall not preclude the party from assigning error in the charge
if an objection which gives the court reasonable guidance is made pursuant to paragraph
(b)." (changes emphasized).
13. See App. E.
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III. THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE REVISION OF THE JURY CHARGE
RULES
Broad-form jury questions became appropriate in all cases on
September 1, 1973.14 For a number of years before then, Texas courts
were required by law to use an excessively complex method for sub-
mitting civil cases to juries.'" The former practice required the use of
specific questions to submit the elements of claims and defenses raised
by the pleadings and the evidence, accompanied by instructions and
definitions of legal terms contained in the questions. 6 In the older
system, questions, definitions, and instructions performed distinctly
different functions.'7 Broad-form submission reduces the number of
jury questions, expands the breadth of the questions submitted, and
increases the role of accompanying instructions and definitions by
enabling the jury to understand the questions submitted and thereby
render a verdict without undue confusion.'8
Despite its many benefits, the adoption of broad-form jury sub-
mission practice created problems for courts and practitioners, con-
cerning the division of labor among jury questions, definitions and in-
structions, and the proper method of preserving complaints
concerning the jury charge for appellate review. 9 On January 1, 1988,
submission of broad-form questions in jury cases was made mandatory
rather than discretionary.' The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure ad-
dressing preservation of charge complaints, however, were not also
revised to correspond to the new method of broad-form submission.
Due to this shortcoming, courts and practitioners were left with the
extremely difficult task of using complex complaint preservation rules
originally designed to apply to a fundamentally different method of
submitting civil cases to juries in an entirely new context.2
14. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Broad-Form Submission of Jury Questions and the
Standard of Review, 46 SMU L. REV. 601, 607-08 (1992); TEx. R. Civ. P. 277 historical
note (Vernon 1976).
15. See Dorsaneo, supra note 14, at 600-09.
16. See id. at 605-07. Each individual issue was required to be submitted "distinctly
and separately."
17. See id. at 604 (discussing early Texas practice).
18. See id. at 609.
19. See Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d
551,555 (Tex. 1986) (holding that although submission of "broad form" issues should be
combined with submission of "appropriate accompanying instructions," failure to do is not
reversible error per se).
20. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (first sentence) ("In all jury cases the court shall, when-
ever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form questions.").
21. Although this problem was recognized by the members of the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee shortly after the new broad-form rules were promulgated, an earlier
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IV. THE FLAWED ORGANIZATION OF THE JURY CHARGE RULES
The procedural rules concerning the preparation and submission
of the trial court's charge to the jury are currently found in Rules 271
through 279.22 From the time of their original promulgation in 19403
through today, these nine rules have been disorganized and deal with
complaints concerning the jury charge in a confusing manner.24 The
four principal rules developed by the Jury Charge Task Force are de-
signed to remedy this organizational problem by using separate rules
containing titled sub-headings and sub-paragraphs to cover the princi-
pal subjects of (a) how and when the jury should be charged,25 (b) the
standards for the charge,26 (c) the preservation of appellate com-
plaints,27 and (d) the treatment of omissions from the charge. 28
As explained below,29 this straight-forward reorganization of the
principal jury charge rules was embraced by the Advisory Committee
and appears to have been tentatively approved by the Texas Supreme
Court when the court's revised draft rules were resubmitted to the
Advisory Committee on May 6, 1996.0
As incorporated in the Recodification Draft, the proposed rules
are a vast improvement over the current rules, because they are better
effort to revise the rules concerning the preservation of complaints was met with substan-
tial political opposition and was ultimately defeated. The proposed rules embraced an
"object-only" system that was perceived to unfairly burden the trial judge with the respon-
sibility for preparing the charge. As argued in this article, the important question is not
whether preservation requires a request or objection, but whether charge complaints, in
whatever form, are adequate to provide the trial court with reasonable guidance in fash-
ioning the charge.
22. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 271-279.
23. Act of May 9, 1939, 46th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 25, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201 (amended
1973) (current version at TEX. R. Civ. P. 271-279). Although the jury charge rules were
subjected to more revision than virtually any other part of the original rulebook, the gen-
eral organization of the charge rules followed the statutory organization of articles 2184-
2190 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, from which the original Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were taken.
24. For example, no one rule provides for the manner of preserving complaints about
the charge. Although Rule 278 contains most of the information, Rules 273-276 also cover
this subject. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 273-276, 278. Because the coverage overlaps, it is some-
times difficult to determine whether preservation of charge complaints requires an objec-
tion, a written charge request, or both.
25. See App. A, Proposed Jury Charge Task Force Rule 271, Charge to the Jury.
26. See App. A, Proposed Jury Charge Task Force Rule 272, Standards for the Jury
Charge.
27. See App. A, Proposed Jury Charge Task Force Rule 274, Preservation of Appel-
late Complaints.
28. See App. A, Proposed Jury Charge Task Force Rule 279, Omissions from the
Charge.
29. See discussion infra Part XII.
30. See App. C.
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organized, and contain procedures that facilitate both the preparation
of a proper jury charge and the preservation of charge complaints in a
manner that is in tune with modern jury submission practice.
V. A SUMMARY OF THE TRADITIONAL PRESERVATION RULES
The most significant and controversial of the proposed rules pre-
scribes the procedures for preserving complaints concerning the jury
charge.3" For more than fifty years, the Texas procedural rules have
divided the practice of preserving complaints at the charge stage by.
requiring either objections or written charge requests." Objections
are required if the alleged defect in the charge involves submitted
questions, definitions, or instructions.3 If, however, the complaint in-
volves an omission from the charge, rather than a defect in a submit-
ted question, definition, or instruction already included within a pro-
posed charge, a written charge request has been required, unless the
omitted matter constituted part of a ground of recovery or defense re-
lied upon by another party?' Under this approach, the complexity of
the specific methods for preserving complaints has been a hallmark of
Texas practice.
Because objections and requests serve different purposes,3" it has
been essential that the practitioner develop an understanding about
when each method is required to preserve complaints about charge
error. Otherwise, under the traditional Texas philosophy concerning
the respective roles of the court and counsel, the complaint was
waived if the wrong procedural mechanism was used, because the trial
judge had no obligation to respond to a complaint that was not made
in the proper form, even if the judge understood the complaint and
could have remedied the problem. 6
In Lyles v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n, the basic rules
were summarized by Justice/Professor Wilson37 as follows:
Although it is now well established, we repeat that under Rules
273, 274, 276, and the first paragraph of Rule 279 [now Rule
31. See App. A, proposed Task Force Rule 274; App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT
RULE 83.
32. See Lyles v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 405 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining respective roles of objections and charge requests).
33. See id. at 727.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See discussion infra Part VI(A)-(B).
37. Justice Frank Wilson served as a justice on the Waco Court of Appeals for a
number of years and also taught procedure courses at Baylor University School of Law. It
is widely believed that the Lyles opinion was actually written for his students.
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278], a request for submission is the method of preserving the
right to complain of omission of, or failure to submit an issue
[question] which is relied on by the complaining party. Objec-
tion, however, is the proper method of preserving complaint as
to (1) an issue [question] actually submitted, but claimed to be
defective; or (2) failure to submit, where the ground of recovery
or defense is relied on by the opposing party.
In the case of explanatory instructions and definitions: if they
are omitted, under Rule 279 a request is prerequisite to com-
plaint of the omission by any party, irrespective of reliance on
an issue. If the definition is given, but is claimed to be defective,
under Rule 274 objection is the means of preserving the com-
plaint.
A request for submission is not an available alternative to an
objection as a means of pointing out a defect in, or preserving a
complaint to a submitted definition or instruction. The request
embodying an element omitted will not be given effect as an
objection under Rule 274.38
Thus, each party has the burden to request the submission of the
elements of claims or defenses and cannot preserve any complaint as
to the omission of elements or claims relied upon by the complaining
party without making a proper request in the appropriate manner.
39
As noted in the quotation, however, an objection to the non-
submission of an element of a ground of recovery or defense relied
upon by an opposing party preserves the right to submission of the
omitted matter.4°  Otherwise, under TExAS RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 279, if elements, which constitute only a part of a com-
plete and independent ground, are omitted, but other elements neces-
sarily referable to that ground are submitted and answered, the omit-
ted elements are deemed found in support of the judgment, if no
objection or request is made and the questions are supported by fac-
tually sufficient evidence.4 1 Finally, the failure to request any of the
necessary elements of a party's claim or defense results in a complete
waiver of that claim or defense under Rule 279.42
38. Lyles, 405 S.W.2d at 727.
39. See id. Under the provision of TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 279, an inde-
pendent ground of recovery or defense not conclusively established by the evidence is
waived if no issue thereon is given or requested.
40. See id.
41. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; See also Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667, 668
(Tex. 1990).
42. See Strauss v. LaMark, 366 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1963).
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VI. THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE CURRENT PROCEDURAL
RULES
A. Separation of Objections and Requests
TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 273 expressly requires that
requests for questions, definitions, and instructions must be submitted
"separate and apart" from objections to the court's charge.43 Under
this approach, mixing requests with objections destroys the efficacy of
the requests as a method for preserving complaints about the jury
charge. For example, in Templeton v. Unigard Security Insurance
Co.," the Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's submission of
an objection to the court's charge with a request for the submission of
a question in one document, entitled "Plaintiffs Objections and Ex-
ceptions to the Court's Charge," resulted in the waiver of the re-
quest.5 Similarly, in Woods v. Crane Carrier Co.,' the plaintiff dic-
tated his requested definition of "unreasonably dangerous" to the
court reporter at the charge conference during the process of making
objections to the proposed jury charge.47 The Texas Supreme Court
held that the objection containing a requested instruction was prop-
erly overruled by the trial court because it was not in writing, as re-
quired by TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 279, and was not made
separate and apart from the plaintiff's objections, as required by
TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 273.4 This "form over sub-
stance" approach to the preservation process was justified on the the-
ory that the trial judge does not have a fair opportunity to consider
the merits of charge requests that are incorporated into objections
made orally during the charge conference. 9 In other words, the Texas
Supreme Court demanded strict adherence to formal requirements to
provide the trial judge a fair opportunity to comprehend the party's
complaint. Not surprisingly, the formal requirement that objections
and requests must be kept separate from each other was applied
strictly by many courts for a number of years. ° More recently, the
Texas Supreme Court has embraced a common sense interpretation of
43. TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
44. 550 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1976).
45. Id. at 269.
46. 693 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1985).
47. Id. at 379.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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.TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 273, which demands more from
Texas trial judges. 1
B. Making the Right Form of Complaint
Under traditional practice, as previously demonstrated in the
Lyles quotation, requests for submission and objections performed
distinct functions in the complaint preservation process. 2 That is, a
request for a correct substitute question, definition, or instruction
would not preserve a complaint if an objection should have been
made to the trial court's proposed charge. 3 Similarly, an objection to
the omission of a definition or instruction from the charge would not
preserve the complaint, because TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
278 usually requires a request for submission of omitted matter to be
made in writing and in substantially correct form . Although the pro-
cedural rules were probably never intended to require both an objec-
tion and a request,5 some appellate courts have reached the conclu-
sion that both an objection and a request are necessary to preserve a
complaint concerning omitted material; in other words, they held that
Rule 278's requirement as to omitted material is in addition to Rule
274's requirement for proper objections. 6 This interpretation of the
51. See Dallas Mkt. Ctr. Dev. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. 1997) (rejecting
the approach that a "trial court's endorsement is a prerequisite to preservation of error, or
that the trial court's failure to comply with [Rule 276] waives the requesting party's com-
plaint"); Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex. 1995) ("While Payne
does not revise the requirements of the rules of procedure regarding the jury charge, it
does mandate that those requirements be applied in a common sense manner to serve the
purposes of the rules, rather than in a technical manner which defeats them."); see also dis-
cussion infra Part IX.
52. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
53. See id.; see also, e.g., Hernandez v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 652 S.W.2d 923,925
(Tex. 1983) (holding that because objections and requests are not alternatively permissible
methods of complaining, the tender of a correct question does not preserve the complaint
when a defectively framed question is contained in the court's charge); Johnson v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 762 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied)
(holding that tender of requested question is not a substitute for an objection and does not
preserve error as to defective submission; failure to object to the defective submission of a
question is considered a waiver of the defective submission) (citing Allen v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex. 1964)).
54. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 278; see also Woods v. Crane Carrier Co., 693 S.W.2d 377,379
(Tex. 1985).
55. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 273 (requiring that requests and objections be made sepa-
rately).
56. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 274; see also, e.g., Gilgon v. Hart, 893 S.W.2d 562, 566 (Tex.
App. -Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (explaining that the rules should be interpreted to
require the complaining party to tender remedial language); National Fire Ins. v. Valero
Energy Corp., 777 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (holding
684
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current procedural rules has some support in the ambiguous wording
of TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 274, which states that "[a]ny
complaint as to a question, definition, or instruction, on account of
any defect, omission, or fault in pleading, is waived unless specifically
included in the objections."57 However, aside from an apparent incon-
sistency of an interpretation requiring both an objection and a request
with TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 273's requirement that ob-
jections and requests to the charge must "be separate and apart,""
such an interpretation of the procedural rules can be used to justify a
trial court's refusal to submit a proper written charge on technical
grounds, as if no objection had been made, even if the trial court rec-
ord shows that the trial judge considered and refused the request.
As the excerpt from the Lyles case also shows,59 it was once the
standard interpretation of the current procedural rules that if a trial
court failed to submit an element relied upon by the other side, a re-
quest would not preserve the complaint, such that the failure to object
to non-submission would waive the right to jury trial.' For example, in
Morris v. Holt,61 the defendant requested omitted questions relied on
by the plaintiff.62 The trial court refused to submit the requested ques-
tions, and, on appeal, the court of appeals held that the defendant's
written request for submission was not sufficient to preserve the com-
plaint.63 That is, the defendant was required to object to the charge
that "it is the complaining party's burden both to object to the charge and tender... in-
struction in substantially correct form"); Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, 747
S.W.2d 873, 878 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (stating if a court fails to
include a limiting instruction, the complaining party must both object to and correct the
written instructions); see also Riddick v. Quail Harbor Condominium Ass'n, 7 S.W.3d 663,
674-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no writ) (discussing the three step process
of tendering an instruction in writing prior to submission, specifically objecting to any
omission, and obtaining a ruling from the court to preserve errors in the omission of an in-
struction relied upon by a requesting party); Jim Howe Homes v. Rogers, 818 S.W.2d 901,
903 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ) ("If the court fails to include in the charge a limiting
instruction on damages, the complaining party must object to the charge and tender a writ-
ten instruction in substantially correct wording on the proper measure of damages.").
57. TEx. R. Civ. P. 274; see also Yellow Cab & Baggage Co. v. Green, 277 S.W.2d 92,
93 (Tex. 1955) ("When the court's charge contains no instruction, the complaining party
must accompany his clear and specific objections to such omission with a substantially cor-
rect definition or explanatory instruction.").
58. TEx. R. CIv. P. 273.
59. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
60. See Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 743, 751 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
61. 714 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1986).
62. See id. at 312.
63. See id.
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for failure to submit a question relied upon by the plaintiff.64 The
Texas Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the defendant's re-
quest for submission was sufficient to preserve the complaint under
Rule 279.65 The Texas Supreme Court followed the San Antonio
Court of Appeals' reasoning in Clarostat Manufacturing, Inc. v. Alcor
Aviation, Inc.' as follows:
[T]here is nothing in the Rule to support the conclusion that an
objection is the only way of calling such omission to the atten-
tion of the trial court. Rule 279 [now Rule 278] requires tender
of an issue in substantially correct form, but then goes on to
provide that where the omitted issue is one relied upon by the
opposing party, an objection shall be sufficient. A statement to
the effect that an objection is "sufficient" cannot be construed
reasonably as a statement to the effect that an objection is "the
sole method by which the error can be preserved." All the Rule
says is that when the omitted issue is an issue relied on by the
opponent, it shall be necessary to tender an issue in substantially
correct form. It does not say that in case of such an omission the
tender of an issue in substantially correct form is insufficient.
The purpose of the Rule is to place a more onerous burden on
the party relying on the omitted issue than on the opponent.
There is nothing in the language to indicate that a party who
notes the omission of an issue relied on by his opponent cannot
call the omission to the court's attention by tendering the omit-
ted issue for submission.67
Thus, a party may preserve complaints regarding an opponent's omit-
ted question through either an objection or by a request.
Another longstanding exception to the traditional rule that objec-
tions and requests are not alternative mechanisms for preserving
charge complaints concerns the placement of the burden of persuasion
to be used by the jury to answer the trial court's jury questions. Be-
cause the failure to fix the burden of proof can be cured either by
changing a question or by adding an instruction, either type of com-
plaint has been recognized as sufficient for some time.6 Thus, if the
trial court fails to place the burden of proof in the charge, the defect is
considered an omission that can be preserved by an objection 9.6  For
example, in City of Austin v. Powell,70 the Texas Supreme Court held
64. See id.
65. See id. at 312-13.
66. 544 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.).
67. Morris, 714 S.W.2d at 312-13 (quoting Clarostat, 544 S.W.2d at 794).





that the submission of a special issue that failed to fix the burden of
proof on either party was an error that could properly'be complained
of either by an objection or by a written request for an instruction that
properly placed the burden of proof.71 The court reached this conclu-
sion because the placement of the burden of proof on the appropriate
party could be accomplished in a jury question or in accompanying in-
structions."
Prior to the adoption of broad-form submission, complaints about
jury questions, instructions, and definitions normally could not be re-
solved except by changing or omitting the flawed question, instruction
or definition. Thus, despite these exceptions, the complaint preserva-
tion rules prescribed specific procedural mechanisms for preserving
charge complaints about the separate components of the court's pro-
posed charge.73 Under this reasoning, until the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. of America,7 4 it
was widely believed that a submitted question could not be challenged
by an objection that the charge failed to include an instruction or
definition necessary to make the question meaningful and accurate
under the substantive law, because such a complaint really concerned
the omission or defective submission of the definition or instruction,
rather than a flaw in the question.75
C. Specificity of Objections
TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 274 provides that objections
must "point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds of
the objection., 76 However, there is considerable controversy about
how informative a party's objection must be to preserve the party's
complaint. There is a general agreement that a party waives a com-
plaint to a defective question unless the objection specifically points
out the matter objected to and the basis for the objection,77 and that an
objection must be specific enough to designate the defect to the
court.78
71. See id. at 275.
72. See id.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Olivarez, 694 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1985, no writ) (holding that although request for instruction fixing burden of
proof would have preserved error, objection to issue because of failure to fix burden of
proof also was sufficient).
73. See former TEX. R. CIV. P. 279 (first paragraph), now TEX. R. CIV. P. 278.
74. 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994); see discussion infra Part X.
75. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
76. TEX. R. CIV. P. 274.
77. See Hernandez v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 652 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1983).
78. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 276 (Tex. 1986) ("The purpose of
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Under better reasoned decisions, the defect and grounds of ob-
jection must be "stated specifically enough to support the conclusion
that the trial court was fully cognizant of the ground of the complaint
and deliberately chose to overrule it."79 There is, however, consider-
able disagreement about whether objections must be sufficient to pro-
vide trial judges with reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge,
particularly when the objecting party does not have the burden to
prove the matter that is the subject of the flawed question, definition,
or instruction.' The problem is highlighted in comment on the weight
of the evidence cases.
In Ahlschlager v. Remington Arms Co.,81 a party objected to the
inclusion of two instructions on sole cause asserting that the instruc-
tions constituted a comment on the weight of the evidence.82 The
court of appeals determined that the objection was sufficient to pre-
serve the objector's complaint as to the submission of the instructions
and their combined effect.83 The court of appeals rejected any re-
quirement that the complainant "go spontaneously into the details of
precisely how and why" the instructions commented on the evidence.'
The court stated that to require "litigants to make full appellate ar-
guments during preparation of the charge [would] run afoul of Rule
274's policy of minimizing verbose, prolix objections."85 Similarly, in
Wilson v. Kaufman & Broad Home Systems,86 a products liability case,
the court held that a party's objection to an instruction as a comment
Rule 274 is to afford trial courts an opportunity to correct errors in the charge, by requiring
objections both to clearly designate the error and to explain the grounds for complaint. An
objection that does not meet both requirements is properly overruled and does not pre-
serve error on appeal.") (citations omitted); Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co.,
601 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1980) (stating that a complaint about variance must be distinct
and specific); see also, e.g., Citizens State Bank of Dickinson v. Bowles, 663 S.W.2d 845,
850 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd) (holding that objection to the
term "market value" was not sufficient because it did not "present the legal requirement to
determine a measure of damages"); Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Taylor, 576 S.W.2d
117, 119-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that an objection in a
condemnation case based on the fact that the question did not submit the proper measure
of damages was too general); Hayes v. Nichols, 203 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1947, no writ) (holding that an objection that a definition is not a correct definition of a
term does not preserve error).
79. Anderson v. Higdon, 695 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see Bowles, 663 S.W.2d at 850.
80. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
81. 750 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).




86. 728 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App. -Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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on the weight of the evidence was not too general and preserved the
objecting party's complaint as to any deviation from the Pattern Jury
Charge. 7 Under this questionable view, an objection is sufficient if it
makes an accurate description of the nature of the problem even
though the objection does not identify the cure.88 For example, under
this approach a question is a comment on the case as a whole when it
identifies the particular word, phrase, sentence, or question even if the
court is not told more about how to solve the problem.9 Other courts
have held that an objection to a question as a comment on the weight
of the evidence is not sufficient. 9°
The court of appeals decisions that require both an objection and
a written charge request reflect judicial dissatisfaction with objection
practice precisely because these courts do not believe that technically
sufficient objections necessarily provide sufficient guidance to trial
judges.91 Unfortunately, these opinions emphasize. the need for a writ-
ten charge request rather than more informative objections. 92
D. Charge Requests Must Be in Substantially Correct Form
Rule 278 requires that a "substantially correct" request for a
definition or instruction must be tendered in writing.93 The words
"substantially correct" were construed by the Texas Supreme Court in
Placencio v. Allied Industrial International, Inc.94 as follows:
[S]ubstantially correct.., does not mean that it must be abso-
87. See id. at 875. Because the requirements with regard to specificity and detail are
not altogether clear, the practitioner is faced with the dilemma of risking making too many
objections and later being vulnerable to the attack that the objections gave too much in-
formation, of not objecting thus resulting in waiver, or making brief objections that do not
provide enough information. Both the Task Force report and the rules in the Recodifica-
tion Draft require objections to "identify that portion of the charge to which complaint is
made and be specific enough to enable the trial court to make an informed ruling on the
objection." Proposed Jury Charge Task Force Rule 278(b); App. E, RECODIFICATION
DRAFT RULE 83(b). Although the matter is still controversial (see infra text accompany-
ing notes 234-41), an informed ruling sustaining an objection to an error in the charge
should require at least reasonable guidance concerning curative action.
88. See Ahlschlager, 728 S.W.2d at 875.
89. See id.
90. See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Depoister, 393 S.W.2d 822, 826-28 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Cummings,
692 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ dism'd).
91. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
92. See id. As explained in Part XIII of this article, during the rule revision process,
the penultimate issue has become the sufficiency of a complaining party's objections to the
charge.
93. TEx. R. Civ. P. 278.
94. 724 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1987).
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lutely correct, nor does it mean one that is merely sufficient to
call the matter to the attention of the court will suffice. It means
one that in substance and in the main is correct, and that is not
affirmatively incorrect.95
Although this standard does not require a charge request to be
completely correct, the appellate courts and the Texas Supreme Court
have interpreted the standard very strictly in cases in which the re-
quest was denied by the trial judge.96 The concept of "substantially
correct" has also offered ample opportunity for appellate courts to
apply a "double standard" to requests. If the trial court submits the
requested instruction or definition, it may be flawed in some manner
and still be substantially correct, at least if a similar instruction is
found in the Texas Pattern Jury Charges.' If, however, the trial court
refuses to submit the requested matter, "substantially correct" may
take on a different meaning. 98 For example, the trial court's refusal of
the request in its entirety has been justified on appeal if any part of
the request is defective.' Despite the traditionally strict interpretation
of the "substantially correct" standard by the courts of appeals and
the Texas Supreme Court, more recent Texas Supreme Court deci-
sions are considerably less rigorous in the interpretation of the tradi-
tional standard.1°°
95. Id. at 21 (quoting Modica v. Howard, 161 S.W.2d 1093, 1094 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1942, no writ)).
96. See, e.g., Select Ins. Co. v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Tex. 1978) (affirming
appellate court's ruling that Select's failure to provide a substantially correct charge pre-
cluded submission of the issue); Placencio, 724 S.W.2d at 22 (holding it was the defendant's
duty to present the trial judge with an affirmatively correct issue and the trial court's re-
fusal to submit an affirmatively incorrect issue was not reversible); Adams v. Rhodes, 543
S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining that where
the complaining party did not meet its burden to produce a substantially correct instruc-
tion, the trial court properly refused to submit the charge); Yellow Cab Co. v. Smith, 381
S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming the trial court's
refusal to submit an issue that could not be presented as submitted); Thomas v. Billingsley,
173 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1943, writ ref'd) (stating that the failure of
the court to submit a charge that was substantially covered by the court's main charge was
not grounds for reversal).
97. See Vela v. Alice Specialty Co., 607 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980,
no writ) (holding that the issue submitted was stated "broadly enough to include the duty
created by statute").
98. See, e.g., Adams, 543 S.W.2d at 19 ("A specially requested special issue, definition
or explanation cannot be substantially correct if its insertion in the charge in the exact
words requested would, upon proper objection, constitute affirmative error upon appeal by
the opponent.").
99. See id.
100. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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E. Voluminous Unfounded Objections or Numerous Unnecessary
Requests Waive Complaints
Rule 274 provides that "[w]hen the complaining party's objection,
or requested question, definition, or instruction is, in the opinion of
the appellate court, obscured or concealed by voluminous unfounded
objections, minute differentiations or numerous unnecessary requests,
such objection or request shall be untenable."1 1 Although this rule
fairly penalizes a party who makes so called stock objections without
attempting to identify the party's specific complaint,1" if a proposed
charge contains a number of objectionable characteristics it is difficult
not to make numerous objections. However, if too many objections
are determined to be unfounded, waiver may result.0 3
Rule 274 has also been used to penalize a party who makes
charge requests containing too much information."l Accordingly, the
often sensible strategy of presenting charge requests to a trial judge in
the form of a complete charge, ready for submission to the jury, po-
tentially subjects the requesting party to a similar problem. Based on
the idea that trial judges should not be required to sift through a com-
bined set of requests, which could be made separately, the use of
combined requests for submission has resulted in waiver of the entire
request. For example, in Crisp v. Southwest Bancshares Leasing Co., °5
the Amarillo Court held that the trial judge was justified in refusing to
give any of the questions tendered en masse if any of them should not
101. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274; see also McDonald v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 380
S.W.2d 545, 549-50 (Tex. 1964) ("But whether or not the objection as presented is too
general to merit consideration, we nevertheless say that it is obscured by many formal and
unfounded and trivial objections."); Hinote v. Local 4-23, 777 S.W.2d 134, 143-44 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (holding that objections to every special
issue, every instruction except one, and the charge as a whole, many of which were invalid,
were a flagrant and extreme violation of Rule 274 and demonstrated the purpose of the
rule, which is to "protect the appellate court from having to waste judicial time by wading
through countless spurious and unwarranted objections"). This part of current Rule 274 is
carried forward in revised form in both the Task Force recommendations and in the Re-
codification Draft. See App. A, Proposed Task Force Rule 274(3); App. E,
RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(c).
102. See Monsanto Co. v. Milam, 494 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. 1973) (holding that defen-
dant's 150 stock objections of "no pleadings" and "insufficient pleadings" were properly
overruled); see also Hinote, 777 S.W.2d at 144 (stating that appellees' "shot gun" objections
were waived because they were a flagrant and extreme violation of Rule 274 and were a
waste of judicial time).
103. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
104. See Crisp v. Southwest Bancshares Leasing Co., 586 S.W.2d 610, 616 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining that the trial court did not err in refus-
ing to submit seven special issues that represented "five separate and distinct subjects").
105. Id.
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be given."° Hence, the trial judge was not required to sift through re-
quested issues and instructions, submitting proper requests and re-
117fusing improper ones.
Although it has been held that trial courts do not commit error in
refusing a charge request that is incomplete because all of the ele-
ments of a ground of recovery or defense are not requested, 8 appel-
late courts have approved trial courts' refusal of the request in its en-
tirety if any part of the combination request is objectionable for any
reason. °9 These courts also have reasoned that trial judges are not re-
quired to sift through voluminous requested questions and instruc-
tions culling the good from the bad, submitting those that are proper,
and refusing those, that are improper."' Some cases suggest that trial
courts may properly reject an en masse request in its entirety even in
the absence of an error in any part of the request."' More recently,
however, the Texas Supreme Court has rejected this philosophy and
taken a common sense approach to the use of combination charge re-
quests."
2
VII. THE EFFECT OF BROAD-FORM SUBMISSION: THE Loss OF
"PHILOSOPHICAL MOORINGS"
Before September 1, 1973, the objection/request practice had a
type of disciplined logic to it because under prior law the role of ques-
tions and instructions in Texas charge practice was fairly rigidly de-
fined."3 There were only a few matters that could be incorporated
into the charge in'question form or as definitions and instructions ac-
companying the questions. 4 This is no longer the case under current
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Attebery v. Henwood, 177 S.W.2d 95, 97-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
109. See, e.g., Edwards v. Gifford, 137 Tex. 559, 564, 155 S.W.2d 786,788 (1941).
110. See discussion supra Part VI(c).
111. See Armellini Exp. Lines of Fla. v. Ansley, 605 S.W.2d 297, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("It is not error for the trial judge to refuse such re-
quested submission when they are intermingled in such a way as to be confusing."); Hoo-
ver v. Barker, 507 S.W.2d 299, 305 (Tex. Civ. App. -Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding
that appellant waived his issues submitted en masse because he did not point out how any
issue was relevant to his defense); Dewey v. Am. Nat. Bank, 382 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining that a trial court can justifiably refuse to
submit every issue submitted en masse were some are merely duplications of others).
112. See Lester v. Logan, 907 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. 1995); see also discussion infra
Part IX.
113. See Dorsaneo, supra note 14, at 644.
114. See id. at 644-45 (stating that in order to avoid complex jury charges, courts rig-
orously applied the principle of necessity which "permitted 'such explanations and defini-
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TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 277, which requires the submis-
sion of broad-form questions whenever feasible.115 Broad-form sub-
mission, however, frequently results in the inclusion of material in the
definitions and instructions that was formerly submitted in a series of
separate questions."6 In broad-form practice, instructions, rather than
separate questions, properly place the specific grounds of recovery or
defense before the jury."7 With the adoption of broad-form submis-
sion, it is very common for a definition or an instruction to perform
the function of submitting the component elements of claims and de-
fenses inquired about more generally in broad-form jury questions.'
Accordingly, under broad-form submission practice, it makes sense
for a party to object to a question because the charge does not include
an appropriate accompanying instruction. In recognition of this
problem, several courts have held that an objection to a broad-form
question that is included in the trial court's proposed charge should
not be sufficient without the written tender of an instruction or defini-
tion containing the necessary remedial language.'19 These decisions
make some sense under broad-form practice if a problem in a broad-
form question may be cured by an instruction or by changing the
question itself, although the courts' real concern is that brief and
sometimes opaque objections to questions may not provide sufficient
guidance to the trial judge. ° Of course, these cases show that the
tions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and ren-
der a verdict on such issues"') (quoting Act of Mar. 27, 1913, 33rd Leg., R.S., ch. 59, § 1,
1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, repealed by Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., Ch. 25, § 1,
1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201).
115. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
116. See Texas Dept. of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990) (ex-
plaining that the controlling question was properly submitted in broad-form and the statu-
tory requirements were covered by an instruction).
117. See Jack Pope, A New Start on the Special Verdict, 37 TEX. B.J. 335, 337 (1974).
118. See Island Recreational Dev. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555
(Tex. 1986) ("Rule 277, as amended, permits the submission of issues broadly even though
they include a combination of elements or issues.").
119. See Gilgon v. Hart, 893 S.W.2d 562, 567 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ
denied) ("[O]bjections that imply the necessary inclusion of limiting instructions or defini-
tions obligate the objecting party to provide those instructions or definitions to preserve
any error."); Jim Howe Homes, Inc. v. Rogers, 818 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. App.-Austin
1991, no writ) ("[T]he complaining party must object to the charge and tender a written
instruction .... ); Wright Way Constr. v. Harlingen Mall Co., 799 S.W.2d 415, 418-19 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (holding that objection and request are required).
These courts reason that the burden of researching the law should not be shifted from the
parties to the trial court. See Gilgon, 893 S.W.2d at 567; Jim Howe Homes, Inc., 818
S.W.2d at 903.
120. See Gilgon, 893 S.W.2d at 567 ("Rule 278 cannot operate to shift the burden of
researching the law from the defendant to the court."); Jim Howe Homes, 818 S.W.2d at
903 (holding that an objection to the court's charge on damages must be accompanied by
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objection/request methodology and its accoutrements are no longer
sensible because the required behavior is dictated as a matter of form
rather than by a principled concern for the respective roles of ques-
tions, accompanying definitions and instructions. As the Texas Su-
preme Court explained in State Department of Highways and Public
Transportation v. Payne,2' as a result of the adoption of broad-form
submission practice, "[t]he procedure for preparing and objecting to
the jury charge has lost its philosophical moorings."'22
VIII. THE NEW PHILOSOPHY: THE "ONE TEST" OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION V.
PAYNE
Recognizing that mandatory broad-form submission increases the
difficulty of determining the proper method to preserve charge com-
plaints, in 1992 the Texas Supreme Court took a new approach to
preservation issues.123 In Payne, the plaintiff was injured when he fell
into a culvert that ran perpendicular to and beneath a highway.24 The
plaintiff filed suit against the State alleging that the culvert was both a
special defect and a premises defect, and that the State had knowledge
of the alleged defect and he did not. 25 The State answered that the
culvert was not a defect of any kind.126 Alternatively, the State as-
serted that the culvert was not a special defect and that under the pro-
visions of the Texas Tort Claims Act, 27 even if a premises defect ex-
isted, the State owed Payne the limited duty that a private landowner
owes a licensee. That is, the State had the duty to "use ordinary care
either to warn a licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a dangerous
condition of which the owner is aware and the licensee is not." 129
The trial court considered the culvert a special defect under the
Texas Tort Claims Act and, therefore, submitted the case by using
standard jury questions.'3 "The first question asked whether Payne's
or the State's negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence.
an instruction on the proper measure of damages); Wright Way Constr., 799 S.W.2d at 418-
19 (holding that objection and request are required).
121. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
122. Id. at 241.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 236.
125. See id. at 236-37.
126. See id. at 237.
127. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.002 (Vernon 1997).
128. See Payne, 838 S.W.2d. at 237.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 238.
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The second question asked what percentage of such negligence was
attributable to each [party] .''
The questions submitted were accompanied by extensive defini-
tions including a legal description of the duty owed by the State where
a special defect exists.'32 The jury found that Payne's injuries were
caused 60% by the negligence of the State and 40% by his own negli-
gence, and trial court rendered judgment in Payne's favor for $148,800
plus interest.33
On appeal, the State argued that the trial court erred in refusing
to inquire of the jury concerning Payne's knowledge of the culvert."'
The State's sole objection to the charge was that the definition of the
duty owed by the State where a special defect exists "constitutes a
comment upon the weight of the evidence and amounts to an instruc-
tion to the jury that there is, in fact, a special defect, removes that is-
sue from the province of the jury and keeps it from being a fact issue
as it should be."'35 The State had also requested the trial court to in-
clude the following question in the charge:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ken-
neth Herschel Payne had actual knowledge that the culvert was
at the location in question on F.M. 1301?'
As argued by three prominent law professors, as amici curiae, the
State's objection and its request were flawed under traditional preser-
vation standards.'37 The objection was insufficient because it errone-
ously asserted that the existence of a special defect is a jury question,
when in fact it is a question of law.' Payne also argued that the
"State ha[d] not preserved its complaint that the trial court erred in
refusing to inquire of the jury concerning his knowledge of the cul-
vert."'39  In rejecting Payne's argument, the Texas Supreme Court
stated that "the issue is whether the State's request [for a question in-
quiring into Payne's knowledge of the culvert] called the trial court's
attention to the State's complaint that no premise liability theory was
submitted to the jury sufficiently to preserve that complaint for ap-
peal. '"' The State's request arguably was not substantially correct
131. Id. at 238.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 236.
134. See id. at 238.
135. Id. at 239.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 243 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 238.
139. Id. at 239.
140. Id. at 239-40.
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and, more importantly, the State's real complaint was that the defini-
tions and instructions that accompanied the broad-form question were
flawed because they submitted a special defect theory, rather than a
premises defect theory.' The court reasoned that despite noncompli-
ance with the strict requirements of the procedural rules, the State's
requested question "clearly called the trial court's attention to the
State's complaint .... The court concluded that although it did not
intend to change the procedural rules by a judicial opinion:
There should be but one test for determining if a party has pre-
served error in the jury charge, and that is whether the party
made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly,
and obtained a ruling. The more specific requirements of the
rules should be applied, while they remain, to serve rather than
defeat this principle.43
Thereby, the Payne "one test" philosophy was established. Ac-
cordingly, Payne signaled that a technical interpretation of the exist-
ing procedural rules is unwarranted, the manner in which a party's
complaint is made is no longer the test for preservation purposes, and
a reviewing court's focus should be on the guidance provided to the
trial judge by the complaining party.'" Reasonable guidance, regard-
less of its form, coupled with a record showing of apparent compre-
hension by the trial court, became the preservation standard.4
IX. REINTERPRETATION OF THE PROCEDURAL RULES UNDER
PA YNE'S PHILOSOPHY
Several subsequent Texas Supreme Court opinions have ex-
tended the Payne philosophy to charge requests that were flawed as a
matter of form or substance.' 6 In Lester v. Logan, the court expressly
disapproved of the court of appeals' affirmance of a trial court's re-
fusal to consider a charge request that incorporated a series of re-
quests. 47 The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that the combination
request, which consisted of only one page, was substantially correct
and complied with TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 274 and 278,
even though it included arguably improper requests with proper
141. See id. at 238.
142. Id. at 240.
143. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
144. See id.
145. See discussion infra Part IX.
146. See, e.g., Lester v. Logan, 907 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1995); Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse,
907 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995).





In Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc.,"49 the court took a similar
"common sense" approach to preservation issues in interpreting cur-
rent TExAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 273, which requires objec-
tions and requests to be "separate and apart."'5° Alaniz submitted a
complete requested charge for various elements of damages, including
future lost profits. 5' The trial court included one page of Alaniz's re-
quest, but redacted references to lost profits.'52 Alaniz objected to the
omission.5 3 The court of appeals faulted Alaniz for not making his
requests separate from his objections, and for making his request be-
fore trial as a complete charge request. The Texas Supreme Court
reversed the lower court in the following terms:
In each respect the court of appeals erred. First, Alaniz' request
was "written" as Rule 273 requires. The rule does not prohibit
including the request in a complete charge as long as it is not ob-
scured. Second, to say that a party does not present a request
after the charge is given to the parties simply because he first
submitted it earlier, when the trial court was clearly aware of the
request, is too strained a reading of Rule 273. Alaniz raised the
issue after the charge was prepared and should not be penalized
for also raising it earlier. Third, Alaniz' written request was
plainly separate from his oral objection, and the appeals court's
view that the two were "improperly entwined" was incorrect.
The court of appeals also erred in concluding that Payne con-
flicts with Rule 273. In Payne we held that a party has pre-
served error in the jury charge when he has made the trial court
reasonably aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and ob-
tained a ruling. While Payne does not revise the requirements
148. See id.; The court of appeals held that Lester improperly submitted his requested
jury questions and instructions. See Lester v. Logan, 893 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied, 907 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). On a single
page, Lester submitted a question on the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, definitions for the terms "implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,"
"producing cause" and instructions on "course of dealing" and "usage of trade." Id. The
trial court refused the group of requests. See id. The court of appeals observed that the
trial court was not required to go through the submitted group of requests and submit the
proper requests to the jury while refusing the improper requests. See id. The court of
appeals also emphasized that Lester did not request and tender a substantially correct
instruction to the trial court in writing and indicated that Lester therefore had waived any
complaint regarding the instruction on appeal. See id.
149. 907 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995).
150. TEx. R. Civ. P. 273.
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of the rules of procedure regarding the jury charge, it does man-
date that those requirements be applied in a common sense
manner to serve the purposes of the rules, rather than in a tech-
nical manner which defeats them. Under the reading of Rule
273 Payne requires, Alaniz preserved his jury charge com-
plaint.
A particularly significant reinterpretation of the "substantially
correct" standard appears post-Payne in the court's opinion in Texas
Department of Human Services v. Hinds.'56 In Hinds, the court made
it clear that a substantively erroneous charge request could satisfy the
requirement that a charge request must be made in "substantially cor-
rect" form.57 Despite the fact that the causation instruction requested
for submission incorporated the wrong standard, the court explained
that the request preserved the complaint for two reasons. "8 First, the
instruction was taken from a concurring opinion endorsed by three
members of the Texas Supreme Court and no other Texas decisions
provide proper guidance.'59 Second, the request called the trial court's
attention to the omission of a definition or instruction concerning the
causation element.' ° Under these circumstances, the trial judge was
not at liberty to disregard the request and to refuse to define the cau-
sation standard in some manner."'
Other Texas Supreme Court decisions also reflect that the court's
primary concern is whether the trial court was made aware of the
complaint in an understandable manner.6 1 In Dallas Market Center
Development Co. v. Liedeker, the court ruled that the trial court's en-
dorsement of the notation "Refused" on a party-written charge re-
quest is not the exclusive method of preserving a requesting party's
complaint,'63 because the trial judge stated on the record that he had
considered the requested question and refused it."s Hence, the defen-
dant's complaint was preserved even though the trial judge neglected
155. Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted).
156. 904 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1995).
157. Id. at 637-38; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
158. See Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 638.
159. See id.; see also Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 725
(Tex. 1990).
160. See Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 638.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Dallas Mkt. Ctr. Dev. Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1997).
163. Id. at 387 ("Rule 276 allows for preservation of error by other means. Consistent
with the rule, the clear weight of authority, and sound policy, we hold that an endorsement





to endorse the request as promised."'
For the most part, these decisions discussed above demonstrate
that the Texas Supreme Court is inclined to interpret the specific re-
quirements of the current procedural rules, which exist to ensure the
trial judge is aware of the complaint about the proposed charge by
evaluating whether the trial record shows that the trial judge under-
stood or should have understood the charge complaint sufficiently to
take some corrective action rather than as a way to insulate the trial
judge's rulings from review.' 66 Under this approach, the trial judge has
the responsibility to evaluate complaints about the proposed charge
and to take appropriate action, including requesting counsel to pro-
vide reasonable guidance concerning how the court should fashion the
charge to address the complaint and obviate the problem.167
X. THE PROBLEM WITH PAYNE'S "ONE TEST"
The Texas Supreme Court's adoption of a new approach presents
its own difficulties because, as shown in Spencer v. Eagle Star Insur-
ance Co. of America,'6' the "one test" can be used to validate charge
complaints that do not really give reasonable guidance to trial
judges.'69 In that case, the Spencers insured their furniture store
through Eagle Star Insurance Company.70 After the store was de-
stroyed by fire, Eagle Star delayed insurance payments and refused to
pay the full policy limits.'71 The Spencers sued Eagle Star for breach
of contract, breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act.72 The trial court submitted two questions
to the jury regarding Eagle Star's liability.' Question 1A asked
whether Eagle Star's treatment of the Spencers' claim for loss of
earnings was an "unfair practice in the business of insurance,"'7 which
was defined in an accompanying instruction as "any act or series of
acts which is arbitrary, without justification, or takes advantage of a
person to the extent that an unjust or inequitable result is obtained."
165. See id.
166. See Proposed Task Force Rule 274, App. A.
167. See discussion infra Part XIII.
168. 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994).
169. See id. at 157.
170. See id. at 155.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 156 n.1.
173. See id. at 156.
174. Id.
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Question 1B asked whether Eagle Star had "engaged in unconscion-
able conduct as defined in section 17.45(5)(A) of the DTPA.' '17 5 Eagle
Star objected, however, to the questions and instructions, because
neither question [was] "based upon a cause of action recognized
under Texas law," and "more specifically.., that [Question 1A]
permits the jury to determine what duty, if any, is owed to the
Spencers, which is a 76question of law for the Court, and not one
of fact for the jury."'
The jury answered Question 1A affirmatively, but "no" to Ques-
tion lB.' The trial court granted Eagle Star judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict on the ground that Question 1A was insufficient to
support the Spencer's recovery, and the appellate court affirmed."'
The issue before the Texas Supreme Court was "whether error in the
instruction accompanying a jury question on liability for an 'unfair
practice in the business of insurance' made the question immaterial or
merely defective." '179 The court held that Question 1A was defective."
The language of Question 1A "unfair practice in the business of insur-
ance" was taken from the Texas Insurance Code,'' but, as the court
noted, that statute "does not refer to every such practice imaginable
but only to those specified by certain other statutes and regula-
tions."'" The court held that "[w]ithout an instruction specifying the
actions for which Eagle Star could be liable, Question 1A was im-
proper."'1 83 Further, the instruction given to the jury did not meet this
requirement, because it allowed the jury to find an unfair insurance
practice based upon any action by Eagle Star that improperly took
advantage of the Spencers." The court also determined that Eagle
Star's objections had preserved error concerning the defective instruc-
tion.' Citing Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc.' and Rule
274,187 the court held that an objection is sufficient to preserve error in
a defective definition or instruction. 18
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 157.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 155.
180. See id. at 157.
181. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).




186. 414 S.W.2d 444, 449-50 (Tex. 1967).
187. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
188. See Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157.
THE JURY CHARGE
The Texas Supreme Court's holding that Eagle Star's objections
to Question 1A and to the accompanying instruction (because neither
one specified the actions for which Eagle Star could properly be held
liable under the Insurance Code)'89 is a sensible extension of Payne's
holding that it does not matter in what manner a defect in the trial
court's charge is brought to the court's attention.'" But the high
court's conclusion that Eagle Star's objections provided proper guid-
ance to the trial court"' is another matter. In fact, it is very likely that
if Eagle Star's counsel had made more informative objections, by
making the same points that were presumably made in connection
with Eagle Star's motion for judgment n.o.v., the objections would
have been sustained. On balance, because it suggests that a formulary
objection is sufficient, the opinion sends the wrong message.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Doggett argued that Eagle Star
had waived error concerning the jury charge.192 But his concerns are
covered in terms of Eagle Star's violation of the technical require-
ments of the procedural rules rather than with the more significant is-
sue of how informative a complaining party's complaint must be un-
der Payne's philosophy." Justice Doggett noted that the majority's
opinion was based on its disapproval of the accompanying instructions
to which Eagle Star never properly objected:
Eagle Star never properly objected to the definition submitted.
Rather, following its objections to the question, the insurer con-
tended only that "we object to the instructions submitted for
these [same] reasons." Rule 274 does not permit the use of such
cross-references in objections.9 4
Justice Doggett criticized the majority for "blurring the line be-
tween questions and definitions," arguing that the majority's opinion
"perpetuates the refusal to adhere to the rules governing objections to
the charge so recently announced in" Payne.'9' Accordingly, Justice
Doggett argued that the majority's opinions in Payne and Eagle Star
made Rule 278 meaningless and concluded that "[i]f the rules are to
change, it should not be by opinion, but by ordered consideration and
public comment."' 9 In other words, rather than recognizing that the
189. See id. at 156-57.
190. See State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241
(Tex. 1992).
191. See Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157.
192. See id. at 159 (Doggett, J. dissenting).
193. See id. at 157-60.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 160.
196. Id. (citing Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. 1992)).
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current procedural rules are inadequate and that the majority misap-
plied the teachings of the Payne decision, the dissent trumpets a re-
treat to the rulebook and arguably to technical preservation rules and
strict attitudes about procedural waiver. 7
XI. INTERPRETING THE COURT'S MIXED MESSAGES
Lower courts have had mixed results in deciding preservation is-
sues under the Payne test, and in accordance with the current proce-
dural rules.'9 Several intermediate appellate courts have recognized
that it no longer matters whether a request or an objection is used to
present the complaint to the trial judge, as long as the record reflects
the trial court understood the complaint or should have understood
the complaint. 199 Similarly, a number of opinions hold that it is no
longer permissible for a trial judge to disregard the complaining
party's objection or request, because it contained some mistake.2"
At the other end of the spectrum, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals initially treated Payne as "advice" that added little or nothing
to the preservation requirements contained in the charge rules; 
201
however, after a series of adverse decisions from the Texas Supreme
Court the court of appeals rearticulated its own views concerning
the preservation of charge complaints -particularly its view that ob-
jections to broad-form questions should be accompanied by suggested
197. See id.
198. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
199. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Garcia, 988 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tex. App.-San Anto-
nio 1999, no pet.) (holding that an objection satisfied the tender requirement of Rule 278);
D.S.A., Inc. v. HISD, 975 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997), rev'd, 973 S.W.2d 662
(Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (explaining that a charge complaint may be preserved by a "suffi-
ciently specific" request or objection); Collins v. Beste, 840 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1992, writ denied); see also In re Stevenson, No. 04-98-00893-CV, 2000 WL
253954, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 8, 2000, no pet. h.) (not designated for publi-
cation) ("[w]e should concern ourself with common sense and not promote form over sub-
stance.").
200. See State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Williams 960 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1997, writ dism'd by agr.) (holding that a requested question was sufficient under Payne,
although "not exactly a model of clarity"); see also Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783,
799 n.12 (Tex. App. -Waco 1997, no writ). But see Cal-Tex Lumber Co. v. Owens Handle,
Co., 989 S.W.2d 802, 816 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, no pet. h.) (holding that neither Rule
274, nor Payne was satisfied).
201. Borden v. Rios, 850 S.W.2d 821, 827 n.3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ
granted), vacated, 859 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1993).
202. See Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex. 1995); see also
Lester v. Logan, 893 S.W.2d 570, 577 (Tex. App. -Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied per
curiam 907 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1995) (holding that petitioner did not waive complaint re-
garding instructions by submitting instructions on a single page).
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instructions and definitions when the objection would not provide suf-
ficient information. 3 In this sensible view, the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals is joined by other appellate courts.2 4
The so-called "one test" expressed in Payne appears to have
spawned a regional jurisprudence under which some appellate courts
operate differently from their counterparts. 5 These courts appear to
be doing the best they can under the current rules and the new ap-
proach to their interpretation and enforcement while awaiting the
promulgation of new rules that can be applied and interpreted in a
principled manner.
XII. THE JURY CHARGE TASK FORCE
The Texas Supreme Court announced its decision in Payne
shortly before the completion of the Jury Charge Task Force's re-
port.2" By the time the report was delivered to the Advisory Commit-
tee and the Texas Supreme Court, the report was described as a
mechanism for incorporating the Payne standard -"whether the party
made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly" -into
the "reasonable guidance" standard made applicable to charge re-
quests.
The Jury Charge Task Force simplified, clarified, and reorganized
the jury charge rules into four rules containing titled subparts-
namely proposed TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 271, 272, 274
and 279.208 The Jury Charge Task Force recommended that the
standards for the jury charge should not be changed. 9 Moreover,
mandatory broad-form submission of jury questions, the prohibition
on submission of inferential rebuttal questions,2 1' and allowance of
203. See Gilgon Inc. v. Hart, 893 S.W.2d 562, 565-67 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994,
writ denied); cf. Barnes v. State Bar of Tex., 888 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1994, no writ) (holding that defendant preserved error by requesting a submission
and obtaining a ruling).
204. See, e.g., Riddick v. Quail Harbor Condominium Ass'n, 7 S.W.3d 663, 674-75
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, n.w.h.) ("If the error is the omission of an instruc-
tion relied on by the requesting party, three steps are required by the rules to preserve er-
ror: a proper instruction must be tendered in writing and requested prior to submission; a
specific objection must be made to the omission of the instruction; and the court must
make a ruling.").
205.. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
206. See State Dept. of Highways and Public Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241
(Tex. 1992); see also App. A, Supreme Court Jury Charge Task Force Proposed Revisions
to TEX. R. Civ. P. 271-79.
207. See Minutes of Rules Advisory Committee for November, 1993.
208. See App. A.
209. See id.
210. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (first sentence); cf. proposed Task Force Rule 272(2)(b).
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sion of inferential rebuttal questions,211 and allowance of disjunctive
submission in proper cases212 are all retained.13  Similarly, the re-
quirement that the trial court submit such instructions and definitions
as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict,214 the prohibi-
tion on direct comments on the weight of the evidence, and the allow-
ance of an otherwise proper question, instruction, or definition that
incidentally comments on the weight of the evidence or advises the
jury of the effect of their answers on the trial court's judgment are
incorporated into the Task Force's recommended rule concerning the
standards for submission of the charge to the jury.1 6 The treatment of
omissions from the charge is also retained in revised language.217
The Jury Charge Task Force recommended four significant
changes in the procedures for preserving complaints concerning the
court's charge to the jury. First, because the current procedural rules
contain an outdated preservation scheme that governs whether an
objection or a request is the proper way to preserve a particular
charge error, the Task Force's proposal eliminates the conundrum
about the need for an objection to the trial court's refusal to submit a
requested question, instruction or definition by requiring an objection
to preserve a party's complaint about the jury charge in all cases.218
Second, under the Jury Charge Task Force's proposal, a party is re-
quired to submit a written charge request on claims or defenses
"which that party was required to plead."2 9 Although practitioners on
the Jury Charge Task Force favored an "object only" system, the re-
quest requirement was included to address concerns expressed by trial
judges.2 Third, because the "substantially correct" test was widely
regarded before the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Payne as a
waiver-prone standard that could be used to require the submission of
211. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (third sentence); cf proposed Task Force Rule 272(2)(e).
212. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (eighth sentence); cf. proposed Task Force Rule 272(d).
213. See App. A.
214. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (second sentence); cf proposed Task Force Rule
272(3)(a).
215. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (last paragraph); cf proposed Task Force Rule 272(1)(b).
216. See App. A, proposed Task Force Rule 272.
217. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 279; cf. proposed Task Force Rule 279.
218. P. Michael Jung, The Jury Charge: What's About to Happen, Advanced Civil Trial
Short Course, SMU School of Law, April 7, 1995, at N6. Mr. Jung was a member of the
Jury Charge Task Force, and acted as liaison between it and the Task Force on Revision of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; See App. A. Proposed Task Force Rule 274. Thus, the
Task Force embraced the view of the courts of appeals that require both a request and an
objection. See supra text accompanying note 53.
219. Proposed Task Force Rule 274, App. A.
220. Jung, supra note 218, at N6.
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a flawless request, a standard of "reasonable guidance" was substi-
tuted.222 Fourth, the Jury Charge Task Force recommended the aboli-
tion of the requirement that objections and requests must be kept
"separate and apart," because the requirement no longer made any
sense under the Task Force's revised preservation scheme and be-
cause it had been strictly interpreted against counsel who simultane-
ously objected and tendered a written charge request to the trial
judge.223
With respect to the important question concerning the sufficiency
of charge objections, the Jury Charge Task Force Report provides
that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give a
question; definition or instruction unless that party objects thereto be-
fore the charge is read to the jury stating distinctly the matter objected
to and the grounds of objection."224 Accordingly, it appears that the
Jury Charge Task Force embraced the line of cases approving objec-
tions that do not necessarily provide trial judges with reasonable guid-
ance in fashioning the charge.2 z Of course, if the objecting party had
the burden to plead the claim or defense, the additional requirement
that the party tender a written charge request would provide the trial
judge with reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge.226 When
Judge Ann Tyrrell Cochran, Chairperson of the Jury Charge Task
Force, presented the Task Force Report to the Supreme Court of
Texas on April 12, 1993, and when she orally presented the Task
Force Report to the Advisory Committee in November, 1993 she ex-
plained that the Task Force believed that once the trial court took
corrective or responsive action in revising the draft charge, the objec-
tion process would provide sufficient guidance and that the party with
the burden to plead the claim or defense should be the one to provide
the trial court with reasonable guidance. 227 As shown in the next sec-
tion of this article, the Advisory Committee debated the issue on sev-
eral occasions, but ultimately, by the narrowest of margins, concluded
221. See supra Part VI.
222. Proposed Task Force Rule 274, App. A ("Defects in a requested question, defini-
tion, or instruction shall not constitute a waiver of error if the request provides the trial
court reasonable guidance in fashioning a correct question, definition, or instruction.").
223. See Templeton v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. 1976); see also
TEx. R. Civ. P. 273; cf. Jury Charge Task Force Rule 274.
224. Proposed Task Force Rule 274. See App. A.
225. See discussion supra Part X.
226. Proposed Task Force Rule 274. See App. A.
227. See letter dated April 12, 1993 from Ann Tyrrell Cochran, Judge 270th District
Court, Houston, Texas to Honorable Nathan L. Hecht, Supreme Court of Texas, transmit-
ting recommended rule changes from the Jury Charge Task Force to the Texas Supreme
Court, which is included in App. A.
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that an objecting party not having the burden to plead would not be
required to provide the trial judge with specific advice concerning how
to cure or correct the charge problem.'z
XIII. THE RECODIFICATION DRAFT
The Jury Charge Task Force's report was favorably received by
the Advisory Committee. The Chairman of the Rules Advisory
Committee, Luther H. Soules, III, submitted the Task Force's Report
to the Advisory Committee's Subcommittee on Rules 216-295."9 In
May of 1994, the Chairperson of the Subcommittee, Paula Sweeney,
reported to the Advisory Committee and made specific recommenda-
tions for revision and clarification of the proposed rules, and, at the
request of Chairman Soules, raised the question of whether the Task
Force's recommended language concerning the sufficiency of an ob-
jection to preserve a complaint should be changed to require an ob-
jecting party to provide specific guidance on how to cure the problem,
even if the party did not have to plead the matter.m After consider-
able debate, the Advisory Committee voted to require that "[a]n ob-
jection must identify that portion of the charge to which complaint is
made and be specific enough to enable the trial court to make an in-
formed ruling on the objection."'
Although a number of important changes were made, the Jury
Charge Task Force's recommendations were largely approved, and
the Advisory Committee submitted its "final" report to the court on
June 5, 1995.232 On May 6, 1996, the court submitted the jury charge
rules, as revised by the court, to the Advisory Committee. 23 After fur-
ther extensive debate concerning the objection process and preserva-
tion issues, on May 27, 1996, the Advisory Committee resubmitted the
jury charge rules to the Texas Supreme Court.2" These drafts were
then incorporated into the Recodification Draft.235 The following
paragraphs describe the most important features of the jury charge
228. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May
10, 1996, at 4636-37. The proposal was defeated by a vote of eight to seven.
229. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, November 20, 1993, at
570.
230. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May
20, 1994, at 1974-81.
231. Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May 20,
1994, at 2001-05.
232. See App. B.
233. See App. C.
234. See App. D.
235. See App. E.
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rules as they appear in the Recodification Draft.
A. Preservation of Charge Complaints
The first sentence of subdivision (a) of RECODIFICATION DRAFT
RULE 83, the basic preservation rule, states that:
After the close of the evidence and before or at the time of ob-
jecting, or at such earlier time as the court may require, a party
must submit to the court in writing the questions, definitions and
instructions requested to be included in the charge on any con-
tention that party was required to plead.236
Consistent with the recommendations of the Jury Charge Task Force,
this sentence makes two major changes in the current procedural
rules. First, objections and requests can be combined. 7 Second, the
rule changes existing law with respect to the burden to request sub-
mission of a definition or instruction.23 Under existing law, regardless
of who had the burden to plead or prove the matter that the definition
or instruction would cover, a party must request its submission, rather
than merely object to the non-submission of the definition or instruc-
tion. The first change is clearly a good one because an objection
that is combined with a request is a sensible way to provide trial
judges with reasonable guidance in the charge preparation process.
The second change is more problematic. It imposes the burden to
provide the trial judge with written charge requests on the party hav-
ing the burden to plead and prove the claim or defense at trial. '40
Thus, by implication the second change suggests that an objection to a
broad form question on the ground that it is not accompanied by an
appropriate definition would preserve a party's complaint, if the ob-
jector did not have the burden to plead, even if the objection did not
provide the judge with sufficient guidance about the content of the
missing definition. However, the problem disappears if the objecting
party's objection must itself provide the trial judge with reasonable
guidance in fashioning the charge, regardless of which party has the
burden to plead the matter. Unfortunately, each time the matter was
presented to the Advisory Committee, the majority of the members
who were present and who voted on the objection standard stopped
short of including specific language requiring the objecting party to
236. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(a).
237. See id. ("before or at the time of objecting. ); cf. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
238. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
239. See id.
240. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(a).
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advise the trial judge how to remedy the problem."'
The next sentence in Rule 83 also contains a noteworthy change.
Charge requests "must be sufficient to provide the court reasonable
guidance in fashioning the charge."'2 42 The current standard, which it-
self has undergone some interpretive change as a result of Payne and
its progeny, requires that the written requests be in substantially cor-
rect form.4 3 The current standard, however, has been replaced in the
new rules by a concept of "reasonable guidance." 2" An instruction
can provide reasonable guidance, even though it is affirmatively incor-
rect."' This appears to be the Texas Supreme Court's view under the
Payne line of cases, at least in certain contexts, as previously ex-
plained. 6 Under this approach, reviewing courts should concentrate
on whether the trial judge understood the requests, rather than on
some more technical standard that minimizes the trial judge's respon-
sibility to take an active role in the charge's preparation.247
The last sentence in subdivision (a) of RECODIFICATION DRAFT
RULE 83 is much more controversial. A significant modification was
made by the Texas Supreme Court in the draft rule recommended for
adoption by the Jury Charge Task Force and the Advisory Commit-
tee."8 Subdivision (a) of the basic preservation rule was rewritten by
the court as follows:
(a) Requests. After the close of the evidence and before or at
the time of objecting, or at such earlier time as the court
may require, a party shall submit to the court in writing the
questions, definitions and instructions requested to be in-
cluded in the charge on any contention that party was re-
quired to plead. The requests must be sufficient to provide
the court reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge.
Failure to comply with this paragraph shall not preclude the
party from assigning error in the charge if an objection is
made pursuant to paragraph (b).249
241. Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May 20,
1994, at 1974-2005.
242. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(a).
243. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 278.
244. App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(a).
245. See supra Part VIII-XI.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. The court also added a subdivision to proposed TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 236, Oath to Jury, that allowed an affirmation in lieu of the oath, changed the
term "judge" to "court" throughout the draft, renumbered Task Force proposed Rules 272
and 274 as proposed Rules 277 and 278, and simplified the language of the proposed rules.
249. App. C, Proposed Task Force Rule 278(a).
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The court's proposed rule is also followed by a textual comment con-
cerning the new sentence.
Comment to 1996 change: Paragraph (a) provides that "failure
to comply with this rule shall not preclude a party from assign-
ing error in the charge if an objection is made to paragraph (b),"
but the court may sanction a party who fails to comply with the
rule.m
When the Texas Supreme Court submitted this change to the
Advisory Committee in May 1996, the Advisory Committee's reaction
was, at best, mixed. Paula Sweeney, Chair of the Advisory Commit-
tee's Subcommittee on Rules 216-295, criticized the court's proposal
in strong terms.25' Another member regarded the change as an ac-
ceptable approach provided that the objection itself provided the trial
court with "reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge. 252. Ulti-
250. Id.
251. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May
10, 1996, at 4594. Paula Sweeney:
[T]he decision of... this Committee was that object-only permitted parties
to lay behind the log, not submit a correct charge on their own issues, and
then at the last minute object; thereby, quote, unquote, preserving appellate
error; thereby sandbagging the trial court; thereby sandbagging opposing
counsel; thereby ensuring appeals; thereby not giving the trial court guid-
ance as to what a proper submission of the issues on which that party has a
burden ought to be. And the very considered decision and in fact the whole
thrust of what the task force and the subcommittee and the [Advisory]
Committee decided was to the contrary.
But what this rule does is provides that a party has a duty to submit ques-
tions on their issues, but if they don't, then all they have to do is object. The
only recourse that the court has is, quote, unquote, a sanction, and the sanc-
tions provision is not part of the rule, it's just a comment to the rule, so I
don't know procedurally the effect of that other than as a suggestion.
Id. at 4594-95.
252. Id. at 4597. Professor Dorsaneo:
The first paragraph [of RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83] still makes it
mandatory that the party with the burden to plead make a request, and it
still provides that requests and objections may be made contemporaneously
in its first line. Granted, the objection preserves the complaint if counsel
doesn't do what's mandated by paragraph (a), but if you think about this op-
erationally, the type of objection that would be required to take the place of
the request would be essentially equivalent to what the written request
would provide ....
I... suggest that the second sentence [of subdivision (b) of the proposed
rule] say an objection must, [(1)] identify the portion of the charge to which
[a] complaint is made; [(2)] be specific enough to enable the trial court to
make an informed ruling on the objection; and ... [(3)], borrowing from
paragraph (a), ... 'provide the court reasonable guidance in fashioning the
charge.'
Then all we're talking about for sure, and I think if you thought about it, you
would have to conclude that that's implicit in the second sentence any-
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mately, the Advisory Committee recommended that the last sentence
of subdivision (a), which deals with the requirements for written
charge requests, be amended to provide that "[f]ailure to comply with
this paragraph shall not preclude the party from assigning error in the
charge if an objection which gives the court reasonable guidance is
made pursuant to paragraph (b)" 3 but refused a more general rec-
ommendation for an amendment of the language of the objection
standard to state that all objections provide the court reasonable
guidance in curing the error."' Thus, the objection standard contained
in Subdivision (b) of RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83 still provides:
(b) Objections. A party may not complain of any error in the
charge unless that party objects thereto before the charge is
read to the jury, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the
grounds of the objection. An objection must identify that portion
of the charge to which complaint is made and be specific enough
to enable the trial court to make an informed ruling on the objec-
tion. Objections must be in writing or must be made orally in
the presence of the court, the court reporter, and opposing
counsel. It must be presumed, unless otherwise noted in the re-
cord, that a party making objections did so at the proper time.55
The Advisory Committee also recommended that the court eliminate
the proposed comment to RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83 .256
The main proponents of the recommendation to require all ob-
jecting parties to provide "reasonable guidance" expressed the view
that all objections should at least attempt to inform the trial judge
how to cure the problem with the objectionable charge. 7 Other
way, ... is... if... you don't make your request but the trial judge is fully
aware of exactly how you want the charge changed because you've said so,
then you're okay and you're not just aced out because of a technical failure
to make a written request.
Id. at 4596-98.
253. APP. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(a); see Texas Supreme Court Advi-
sory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May 10, 1996, at 4643.
254. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May
10, 1996, at 4636-37. The proposal was defected by a vote of eight to seven.
255. See App. E (emphasis added).
256. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May
10, 1996, at 4628.
257. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May
10, 1996, at 4617. David Keltner: ("[M]y suggestion would be leave (a) as it is, but go to
(b) and make Bill Dorsaneo's change.").
[Tihe truth of the matter is we ought not to have somebody hiding behind
the log saying, 'I see something wrong. I'm not going to tell you what it is. I
see something wrong, and Judge, if you don't change it, na-na-na, I'm going
to reverse you on appeal.' Anybody would find that situation laughable that
wasn't a lawyer, and no one loves lawyers more than I, but that is silly.
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members regarded this suggestion as imposing an undue burden on
the party not having the burden to plead-that is a burden to advise
the trial judge how to submit the other party's case.258
Otherwise, although wording changes have been made in these
provisions, the Recodification Draft preserves: (1) the obscured or
concealed objections provision,259 (2) the case law concerning the need
for express or implicit rulings, 26 and (3) the provisions concerning the
making of evidentiary sufficiency complaints.' The Recodification
Draft also incorporates the requirements of TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 279 regarding waived grounds and deemed elements.262
On May 27, 1996, Luther H. Soules, III, Chairman of the Advi-
sory Committee, reported to the court: (1) the suggested change to the
last sentence of subdivision (a) of proposed TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 278, (2) the Committee's recommendation for deleting
the comment to the proposed rule, and (3) the part of the meeting
transcript pertaining to the discussions about the jury charge rules.263
We ought to get over the idea that we're trying lawsuits just for ourselves,
and we ought to try the charge deal one time and one time only and not have
reversals on that basis, even though it will cost me a lot of business, so I'd go
with Bill Dorsaneo's change.
Id. at 4618-19.
See also id. at 4620. David Perry:
The objection ought to give the court reasonable guidance as to how to cure
the error that is being complained of. I agree very much with what David
Keltner says, that the object is to get a correct charge. The object is not to
lay the basis for an appeal.
Id.
258. See Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee transcript, Morning Session, May
10, 1996, at 4598-99. Richard Orsinger:
Bill's suggestion makes me uncomfortable because I think it could be inter-
preted as requiring that an objection also include the proposed language. If
the objection must give reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge, then
you've got to do more than point out a defect in my view; you have to pose a
solution.
Id.
259. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFt RULE 83(c); cf TEX. R. CIV. P.274.
260. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(d); cf Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.
261. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 83(e); cf. TEX. R. CIV. P. 279.
262. App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 84(b); cf TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
263. See letter from Luther H. Soules, III, Chairman, Texas Supreme Court Advisory
Committee, to Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Justice, Supreme Court of Texas (May 27, 1996)
(on file with William V. Dorsaneo, III); see also App. D.
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B. Standards for the Jury Charge
1. Adoption of the Burden to Plead Standard
Rule 278 currently allows a party to either request or object to
the omission of 'a jury question "if the question is one relied upon by
the opposing party.''26' Because a broad form jury question may com-
bine a ground of recovery and a ground of defense, as explained
above, the Jury Charge Task Force recommended adoption of a "bur-
den to plead" concept as a replacement for the reliance concept. 265
Under the "burden to plead" concept recommended by the Jury
Charge Task Force and embraced by the Advisory Committee, if a
party has the burden of pleading a claim or a defense under the other
rules of procedure, the party is not entitled to the submission of the
claim or defense in the form of a question, instruction, or definition,
unless the matter is affirmatively raised by the party's pleadings.266
TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 45 and 47 require that a plaintiff
plead a cause of action2 67 and that a defendant plead grounds of de-
fense 2' by giving fair notice of the claim involved and of the de-
fenses.6 ' The grounds of defense fall into three categories: (1) specific
denial defenses; 270 (2) general denials, which are permitted unless a
specific rule or statute requires more specificity;271 and (3) affirmative
defenses,272 which must be stated affirmatively.2 73 Accordingly, these
basic pleading rules have been incorporated into the proposed jury
charge rules. Despite this improvement, one old problem remains.
For some time, Texas lawyers have had difficulty with the procedural
requirements for pleading and proving inferential rebuttal defenses.274
Because no specific pleading rule addresses inferential rebuttal
defenses and because, as a matter of logic, a general denial supports
264. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
265. See App. A, Proposed Task Force Rule 272(1)(a).
266. See id.
267. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 45.
268. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 47.
269. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 45, 47.
270. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93.
271. TEX. R. Civ. P. 92.
272. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
273. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
274. See Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192-93 (Tex. 1971) (holding that in-
ferential rebuttal defenses are best submitted to the jury as explanatory charges or defini-
tions because "[t]he only legitimate purpose to be served in submitting unavoidable acci-
dent is to call the matter to the attention of the jury, so that it will not be overlooked .). 
(quoting Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341,153 S.W.2d 449 (1941)).
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the introduction of evidence concerning alibi defenses and converse
theories, it has not been necessary for defendants to plead affirma-
tively and specifically the rebuttal defenses of unavoidable accident,
sole proximate cause, sudden emergency, and Act of God to present
evidence of these defensive matters during trial. From the standpoint
of the pleading rules, inferential rebuttal defenses can be raised by
general denials.
The 1940 revisions to the jury charge rules, however, imposed the
burden on a defendant who wanted the court to submit an inferential
rebuttal defense in question form, to plead the rebuttal defense af-
firmatively to obtain submission of the rebuttal defense in question
form.275 Accordingly, until the submission of inferential rebuttal de-
fenses in question form was prohibited in 1973, to obtain submission
of an inferential rebuttal question, a defendant was clearly required to
plead rebuttal defenses specifically."6 Unfortunately, when the Texas
Supreme Court revised the basic charge rules in 1973, prohibiting
submission of inferential rebuttal questions, the pleading requirement
was not changed.277 As a result, it has been unclear whether a defen-
dant must affirmatively plead inferential rebuttal defenses in specific
form to obtain submission of an instruction, although all defense law-
yers know that is what they should do. The Recodification Draft has
not expressly corrected this oversight, although it can be reasonably
argued that the inclusion of the word "affirmatively" in the first sen-
tence of subdivision (a) of Rule 82 means "specifically" and clearly
imposes the burden to plead rebuttal defenses on defendants. 8
2. Retention of Mandatory Broad-Form Submission of Jury
Questions
The Recodification Draft also incorporates the broad-form sub-
mission sentence that is the first sentence of Rule 277.279 Although the
Texas Supreme Court has recognized that broad form submission is
not always feasible, in most cases it is capable of being accom-
plished."
275. See former TEX. R. CIv. P. 279 (first paragraph).
276. 5 TEX. B.J. 236 (1942).
277. See former TEX. R. CIV. P. 277 (1941, amended 1973).
278. App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 82(a).
279. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 82(b) (second sentence); cf. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 277 (first paragraph).
280. See Texas Dept. of Human Servs. v. E. B., 802 S.W.2d 647,.648-49 (Tex. 1990); see
also William V. Dorsaneo, 111, 8 TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 122.02[3][b] (2000).
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3. Conditional Submission of Damage Questions
Conditional submission of jury questions is proper and has been
appropriate for some time. For the first time in 1988, a sentence was
added to TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 277 (the last sentence
of the third paragraph) stating that it is proper to condition or predi-
cate the submission of a damage question on affirmative findings of
liability."' That sentence, which has been extremely controversial,"
has not been specifically included in the Recodification Draft, unless it
is incorporated by inference in subdivision (b) of RECODIFICATION
DRAFT RULE 82 which speaks more generally of the proceedings of
the Advisory Committee.283 The omission of the controversial sen-
tence makes it possible to argue that both the sentence, and the
authorization to predicate damage questions on affirmative findings,
have not been carried forward into the Recodification Draft. None-
theless, although it can be argued that the general language in
RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 82(b) is not specific enough to
authorize the trial court to predicate the submission of damage ques-
tions on affirmative findings of liability, the Jury Charge Task Force's
Report indicates briefly that the sentence was incorporated in the
Task Force's Report, rather than superseded by it.2"
4. Problems of Disjunctive Submission
Disjunctive submission has also been preserved in the Recodifica-
tion Draft."5 The disjunctive submission provision contained in Rule
277 was added to the jury charge rules in 1940 as an exception to sepa-
rate and distinct submission." Accordingly, disjunctive submission is
simply one type of broad-form submission. The failure of some ap-
pellate courts to recognize this reality has created unnecessary diffi-
culties."7 For example, there is one particularly troubling case that
disapproves of the use of a perfectly acceptable broad-form jury ques-
tion, because the question did not involve strict alternatives.2" In
281. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
282. See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 23-25 (Tex. 1998) (holding
that the trial court did not err in allowing a conditional damage jury instruction).
283. See id.
284. See App. A, Proposed Task Force Rule 272(2)(c).
285. See App. A, Proposed Task Force Rule 272(2)(d).
286. 8 TEx. B.J. 281 (1945).
287. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.




Rathmell,m a bill of review case involving an attack on a property set-
tlement agreement that was incorporated into a divorce decree, the
court of appeals disapproved of the following question: "Do you
find.., that Mary Ann Rathmell, unmixed with any negligence on her
part, was induced to agree to the divorce settlement agreement by
false representations made by John A. Rathmell or by coercion on his
part, or by his failure to disclose material facts?"' 9 The court found
the question problematic because the question had more than two al-
ternatives and under Rule 277 disjunctive questions may be used only
to present "true opposites, [defined as] alternative grounds of recov-
ery which are factually inconsistent."'2 9' Clearly, such a conclusion is
nonsense under the current regime of broad-form submission. Thus,
the disjunctive submission provision should be construed to mean only
that an "either/or" submission is not appropriate, unless the evidence
shows that only one of the matters inquired about necessarily exists.
Of course, if that is all that the rule's provision about disjunctive
submission means, the provision is unnecessary. However, the Re-
codification Draft contains another companion sentence, added by the
Advisory Committee, which provides that a proper disjunctive ques-
tion that submits a defensive theory as an alternative to a claimant's
theory is not an impermissible inferential rebuttal submission.2" Ar-
guably, the new sentence allows the submission of inferential rebuttal
defenses in question form, thereby reversing a Texas Supreme Court's
decision on the point.293
5. Retention of Current Standards Regulating Comments on the
Evidence
The Recodification Draft incorporates the current standards con-
cerning direct and incidental comments on the weight of the evi-
dence.294  Direct comments are prohibited.295  Moreover, the jury
charge cannot include an incidental comment on the weight of the
evidence or advise the jury of the effect of an answer, unless it is
289. See id.
290. Id. at 11.
291. Id. at 12 (citing Parker, v. Keyser, 540 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
292. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 82(b).
293. See Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1984) (holding that the trial
court erred in submitting an issue that compelled plaintiff to negate unavoidable accident).
294. Compare App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 82(a), with TEX. R. Civ. P.
277 (last paragraph).
295. See App. E, RECODIFICATION DRAFT RULE 82(a).
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proper for the charge to do so to enable the jury to render a verdict.296
Although this circular formulation is not altogether clear, it incorpo-
rates the body of law that has developed since 1973 concerning the
submission of broad-form questions and appropriate accompanying
definitions and instructions."
XIV. CONCLUSION
The current procedural rules have remained too long after the
loss of their philosophical moorings. The court should officially pub-
lish the proposed rules for public commentary as required by law298 as
soon as possible, and promulgate new rules as soon as it is politically
feasible to do so. The court's own efforts to remedy deficiencies in
the current rules by judicial decisions are not an adequate substitute
for their wholesale revision. It is now unclear whether: (1) an objec-
tion is technically necessary when a charge request is made, (2) a
charge request is required when an objection does not tell the trial
judge how to solve the problem the complaint identifies, and most im-
portantly (3) how informative an objection must otherwise be to pass
procedural muster. Adoption of the revised jury charge rules as they
appear in the Recodification Draft preferably with a slight modifica-
tion to the basic preservation rule to make it crystal clear that all ob-
jections must provide reasonable guidance, is long overdue. Adoption
of these rules will help the bench and bar to reconceptualize the whole
process as a joint effort on the part of the court and counsel to pre-
pare a proper charge rather than as an appellate preservation game.
Part of the problem with the current rules is that they no longer pro-
vide reliable guidance, predictable results, or a coherent jurispru-
dence. A much more serious problem is that the current rules misper-
ceive the proper objective of the charge phase of the litigation
process, which is to get a correct charge, not to lay the basis for an ap-
peal.
296. See id.
297. See supra Part VII.














Enclosed for consideration by the Supreme Court are recom-
mended rule changes from your Task Force on Rules Relating to the
Jury Charge. These proposals have the unanimous recommendation
of the members of that task force and, as explained in greater detail
below, are the result of our consulting with a great many other law-
yers, judges and law professors.
The greatest challenge to the task force came in considering pro-
posals to simplify the means to preserve appellate complaint. As you
well know, an earlier proposal to move to an "object only" system
raised a good deal of opposition from the trial bench. In order to un-
derstand the concerns of the trial judges, we asked Justice Linda
Thomas, then chair of the Judicial Section, to appoint several trial
judges from across the state to meet with us and share their concerns.
Our two meetings with these judges were very productive. All agreed
that the current system needed to be revised to simplify preservation
of error, but given the complicated nature of so much civil litigation,
and the lack of clerical support, time, and research facilities so many
trial judges face, there was a serious concern that total abolition of the
tender requirement would give rise to greater problems in preparing a
correct charge at the trial court level. Thought was given to earlier
proposals to allow judges to order tender without making tender a
prerequisite to appellate complaint, but we concluded that the lack of
appellate consequences made such orders unenforceable and thus un-
helpful.
In addition to the trial judges, task members have sought and re-
ceived advice and comment from the consultant group, many lawyers
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who have expressed interest in our work, and scholars. We feel that
our conclusions have the support of a wide cross-section of the trial
and appellate bar as well as the trial judiciary.
The conclusion of the task force was that objection should always
be required, but that an additional requirement of written tender
should be necessary only in the following limited circumstances: (1)
the question, definition, or instruction is totally omitted from the pro-
posed charge; and (2) it is something that party has the burden to
plead. This approach gives the trial judge the "bare bones" of the
charge, but alleviates the current problem of requiring a party to write
a correct charge for the opposing side.
We also addressed the problems currently posed by the appellate
construction of the requirement that any tender be in "substantially
correct" form, and have proposed instead the following language:
"Defects in a requested question, definition, or instruction shall
not constitute a waiver of error if the request provides the trial court
reasonable guidance in fashioning a correct question, definition, or in-
struction."
The task force believes that this approach satisfies the legitimate
concerns of the trial bench and offers as well as workable system of
preservation of error.
The task force retained the substance of Rule 279 regarding the
effect of omissions from the charge. Two substantive clarifications
were made: (1) that express or deemed findings by the court on omit-
ted elements may be made against any party who has failed to pre-
serve appellate complaint regarding the omission, but not against a
party who has preserved appellate complaint; and (2) that evidentiary
sufficiency challenges to express findings under Rule 279 are governed
by the same rules for preservation of appellate complaint as in the
case of findings in bench trials. See Tex. R. App. P. 52(d).
The jury instructions (Rule 226a) have been rewritten, primarily
to simplify the language used and to reorganize at what point in the
trial certain instructions are given. A few are new. Instructions about
conduct in the jury room and the role of the presiding juror were
added at the suggestion of trial judges who have found over the years
that jurors need more information about the stage of the trial. An in-
struction about the effect of sustaining evidentiary objections has been
added, as has one telling the jury that they are bound to follow the law
whether they think it is right or wrong. (The latter was added as em-
phasis in light of the fact that the types of jury misconduct that may be
grounds for motions for new trial have changed since the Rule 226a
instructions were originally written.)
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We did attempt to consolidate and reorganize the rules with
which we were dealing, and understand that Professor Dorsaneo's
task force will be looking at these aspects as well. Michael Jung, of
our task force, is serving as our unofficial liaison with that group.
The enclosed report is submitted in two forms: (1) a plain copy of
the proposal; and (2) an annotated version, with underlining and
strike-outs to show the changes.
Thank you for allowing me to work on this project for you. The
members of the task force are excellent lawyers and fine people. It
has been a pleasure to serve with them.
Very truly yours,
Ann Tyrrell Cochran
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
SUPREME COURT JURY CHARGE TASK FORCE
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO TEX. R. CIV. P. 271-79
REVISED DRAFT 10/19/92
RULE 271. CHARGE TO THE JURY
Amended Text
Unless expressy waived by the par
ties; Tthe trial court shall prepare
anid in open e •rt deliv,, a written
charge to the jury. The court shall
provide counsel with written copies
of the proposed charge, and shall
provide a reasonable opportunity
for the parties to prepare their
requests and objections and to
present them on the record outside
the presence of the jury after the
conclusion of the evidence and
before the charge is read to the jury.
After the requests and objections
are made and ruled upon and any
modifications to the charge are
made, the court shall read the
charge to the jury in open court in
the precise words in which it is
written. The court shall deliver one
or more copies of the written charge
to the jury. The charge shall be






sentence of New Rule 271
Source: Second sentence of
Current Rule 272 and
second sentence of Current
Rule 273
Source: Current Rule 275
Source: First sentence of
Current Rule 271
Source: First sentence of
Current Rule 272
RULE 272. REQUISIT STANDARDS FOR THE JURY
CHARGE
Amended Text Sources and Dispositions
The charge shall be in writing,
signed by the court, and filed with Disposition: Omitted as
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the clerk, and shall be a part of the
record of the cause. It shall be
submitted to the respective parties
or their attorneys for their
inspection, and a reasonable time
given them in which to examine and
present objections thereto outside
the presence of the jury, which
objections shall in every instance be
presented to the court in writing, or
be dictated to the court reporter in
the presence of the court and
opposing counsel, before the charge
is read to the jury. All objections
not so presented shall be considered
as waived. The court shall announce
its rulings thereon before reading
the charge to the jury and shall
endorse the rulings on the
objections if written or dictate same
to the court reporter in the presence
of counsel. Objections to the charge
and the court's rulings thereon may
be included as a part of any
transcript or statement of facts on
appeal and, when so included in
either, shall constitute a sufficient
bill of exception to the rulings of the
court thereon. It shall be presumed,
unless otherwise noted in the record,
that the party making such
objections presented the same at the
proper time and excepted to the
ruling thereon.
Disposition: First sentence of New
Rule 271
Disposition: Fifth sentence of New
Rule 271
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Disposition: Second sentence of
New Rule 271
Disposition: Second sentence of
unnecessary
Disposition: Third sentence of
New Rule 274(2)
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New Rule 274(2)
Disposition: First sentence of New
Rule 274(2)




has the burden of pleadin1
shall not be entitled
submission of a
instruction, or definition
that matter unless the

















may submit a question dis
when the evidence shows a
of law that one or the ot
Comment on the Evidence.
)arty who The court shall not directly
g a matter comment on the weight of the
to the evidence or advise the jury of
question, the effect of their answers, but
regarding an otherwise proper question,
matter is instruction, or definition shall
he party's not be objectionable on the
ground that it incidentally
of second constitutes a comment on the
weight of the evidence or
advises the jury of the effect
of their answers.
of ninth Questions.
In General. The court shall
submit questions on the
disputed material factual
issues which are raised by
the pleidings and the
evidence.
Broad Form Submission.
The court shall, whenever
feasible, submit the case
upon broad form questions.
The court Rule 277
jury's Source: Adapted from
or more eighth sentence of Current
inswers to Rule 277
estions on Source: Third sentence of
of the Current Rule 277
questions Source: Second sentence of
Current Rule 277 and
The court first sentence of Current
sjunctively Rule 278
as a matter Source: Fourth sentence of
her of the Current Rule 277
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conditions or facts inquired about
necessarily exists.
Inferential Rebuttal. Inferential
rebuttal questions shall not be
submitted.
Instructions and Definitions.
In General. The court shall submit
such instructions and definitions as
shall be proper to enable the jury to
render a verdict.
Burden of Proof. The placing of the
burden of proof may be
accomplished by instructions or by
inclusion in the questions.
Source: Adapted from first sentence
of Current
Rule 278
Source: First sentence of Current
Rule 277
Source: Generalization of seventh
sentence of Current
RULE 273. JURY SUBMISSIONS [Repealed]
Amended Text Sources and Dispositions
Either party may present to the
court and request written questions,
definitions, and instructions to be
given to the jury; and the court may
give them or a part thereof, or may
refuse to give them, as may be
proper. Such requests shall be
prepared and presented to the court
and submitted to opposing counsel
for examination and objection
within a reasonable time after the
charge is given to the parties or their
attorneys for examination. A
request by either party for any
questions, definitions, or
2000]
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
instructions shall be made separate
and apart from such party's
objections to the court's charge.
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Disposition: Second sentence of
New Rule 271
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Disposition: Requirement repealed
RULE 274. OBJECTIONS AND REQUESTS
PRESERVATION OF APPELLATE COMPLAINTS
Amended Text
Requests. A party may not assign as
error the failure to give a question,
definition, or instruction on a
contention which that party was
required to plead unless the record
reflects that, after the conclusion of
the evidence and before or at the
time of objecting, the party tendered
such question, definition, or
instruction to the judge in writing.
Defects in a requested question,
definition, or instruction shall not
constitute a waiver of error if the
request provides the trial court
reasonable guidance in fashioning a
correct question, definition, or
instruction. If a request has been
filed and bears the judge's signature,
it shall be presumed, unless
otherwise noted in the record, that
the request was tendered at the
proper time.
Objections. No party may assign as error
the giving or the failure to give a ouestion.
Sources and Dispositions
Source: Adapted from fifth
and sixth sentences of
Current Rule 278
Source: New





definition, or instruction unless that party
objects thereto before the charge is read to
the jury. A party objeeting to a charge
must point .cu stating distinctly the
ebjee.ienable matter objected to and the
grounds of the objection. An objection is
required even if the objecting party is
required to tender a request under
paragraph 1 of this rule. Objections shall
be in writing or shall be made orally in the
presence of the court, the court reporter,
and opposing counsel. It shall be
presumed, unless otherwise noted in the
record, that a party making objections did
so at the proper time. Any ceomplaint as to
a question, definition, or instruction, on
ficourn Of- an), derccu, omission, or raif fn
pleading, is waived unless specifically
included in the objeeticns.
Source: Second sentence of Current Rule 274
Source: New
Source: Second sentence of Current Rule.272
Source: Sixth sentence of Current Rule 272
Disposition: First sentence of new Rule 274(2)
Obscured or Concealed Objections
or Requests. When thee ,mp.ini.g
pmrty' an objection; or requested
question, definition, or instreuet o.
is, in the capittin of the appellate
eout, obscured or concealed by
voluminous unfounded objections or
requests, minute differentiations, or
numerous unnecessary objections or
requests, such objection or request
shall be untenable not preserve
appellate complaint. No objection
to one part of the charge may be
adopted and applied to any other
part of the charge by reference only.
A judgment shall not be reversed
Source: Adapted from fourth
sentence of Current
Rule 278
Source: Fourth sentence of.
Current Rule 272
Source: Acord v. General
Motors Corp.,
669 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984)
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because of the failure of the court to
submit different shades of the same
question, instruction, or definition.
Rulings. The court shall announce
its rulings on objections in open
court before reading the charge to
the jury. In the absence of an
express ruling, any objection not
cured by the charge is deemed
overruled.
Evidentiary Sufficiency Complaints.
A claim that there was no evidence
to support the submission of a
question, or that the answer to the
question was established as a matter
of law, may be made for the first
time after the verdict. A claim that
there was factually insufficient
evidence to support the jury's
answer to a question, or that the
answer to the question was against
the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence, must be made after
the verdict. Any of such claims may
be made regardless of whether the
submission of the question was
requested by the complainant.
RU1E 275. CHARGE READ BEFORE ARGUMENT [Repealed]
Amended Text Sources and Dispositions
Beforez the argument -19
begun, the trial eourt shall
read thec harg, to the jury
in the preeise words InI
whieh it was written, ine tud
ing all qucestions,
defintions, and instrueticnm
which the o.rt may giv.
Disposition: Third sentence of New
Rule 271
THE JURY CHARGE
RULE 2 76. REFUSAL OR MODIFICATION [Repealed]
Amended Text
When an instruction, question, or
definition is requested and the
provisions of the law have been
complied with and the trial judge
refuses the same, the judge shall en-
dorse thereon "Refused," and sign
the same officially. If the trial judge
modifies the same the judge shall
endorse thereon "Modified as
follows: (stating in what particular
the judge has modified the same)
and given, and exception allowed"
and sign the same officially. Such
refused or modified instruction,
question, or definition, when so
endorsed shall constitute a bill of
exceptions, and it shall be
conclusively presumed that the party
asking the same presented it at the
proper time, excepted to its refusal
or modification, and that all the
requirements of law have been
observed, and such procedure shall
entitle the party requesting the same
to have the action of the trial judge
thereon reviewed without preparing







of New Rule 274(1),
in modified form
RUL6E 277. S!TU IT" N TO THE JURY [Repealed]
Amended Text Sources and Dispositions
In all jury cases the court











SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
court shall submit such instructions
and definitions as shall be proper to
enable the jury to render a verdict.
Inferential rebuttal questions shall
not be submitted in the charge. The
placing of the burden of proof may
be accomplished by instructions
rather than by inclusion in the
question.
In any cause in which the jury is
required to apportion the loss
among the parties the court shall
submit a question or questions
inquiring what percentage, if any, of
the negligence or causation, as the
case may be, that caused the
occurrence or injury in question is
attributable to each of the persons
found to have been culpable. The
court shall also instruct the jury to
answer the damage question or
questions without any reduction
because of the percentage of
negligence or causation, if any, of
the person injured. The court may
predicate the damage question or
questions upon affirmative findings
of liability.
The court may submit a question
disjunctively when it is apparent
from the evidence that one or the
other of the conditions or facts
inquired about necessarily exists.
The eut shall not in its cherge
cofa ent dire tly on the weight of the
eviden e or advise tie jur' of the effet
of their answ.ers, but the eeurt's charge










Disposition: Omitted as too
case-specific for inclusion in
the Rules of Civil
Procedure
Disposition: New Rule
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ground that it inidentally con.stitutes a
ceoAent on the weight of the evidene
or advises the jury of the effect of theji
answers when it is prpely a pat of an
ifistruction or definition.
RUL6E 2148. SUBMMSSION OF QUESTIONS, DEFINITONS,
AND INSTRUCTIONS [Repealed]
Amended Text Sources and Dispositions
The ccurt Shall submit the questions,
instructiens and definitions in the fen:m
provided by Rule 277, which afe raised
by the written pleadings and the
evidence. Except in tr~espass to try,
title, statutory patitioni proceeedinigs,
and ether: special proceeedings in which
the pleadings are specially defined by
statutes or proceedural rules, a party
shall noet be entitled to an' submission
of an" question raised "1nly by a
general denial and not raised by
affirmative writteni pleading by that
party. Nothing herein shall change the
burden of pref ferm what it weul
have been under a general denial.A
judgment shall noet be reversed because
of the failure to submit other and
varous phases or ditterent shades of
the samfe questiefn. Failure to submnit a
question shall noet be deemfed a groeund
fcr reversal of the judgment, uniless 4ts
submfission, in substantially eoffect
wording, has been requested in writing
and tendered by the eav comelainine
of the judgment; providcd, however,
that objection to such failure shal
suffice in sucb respect if the question is
one relied upen by the opposing pafy.Failure to submit a definitioRn eF
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inspition: shall net be deemed a
gond f r r)eversal f the judgment
unless a substantially correct definitient
or instruction has been requested in
writing and tendered by the paty
complaininig of the judgment.
Disposition: New Rules 272(2)(a)
and 272(3)(a)
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Disposition: New Rule 272(l)
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Disposition: Third sentence of New
Rule 274(3)
Disposition: First sentence of New
Rule 274(1), in modified form
Disposition: First sentence of New
Rule 274(1), in modified form
RULE 279. OMISSIONS FROM THE CHARGE
Amended Text Sources and
Dispositions
Omission of Entire Ground. Upei
appeal all ny independent grounds
of recovery or of defense which is not
conclusively established under the
evidence and no element of whih is
submitted or requested all elements
of which are omitted from the charge
without preservation of appellate
complaint by the party relying
thereon mre is waived.
Omission of One or More Elements.
When an independent ground of
recovery or defense consists of more
than one element, if and one or more
of stteh the elements necessary to
sustain such ground of recovery or
defense, and necessarily referable
thereto, are is submitted to and
found by the jury, and one or more
[Vol. 41:675
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of such elements are is omitted from
the charge, with,ut request or
obj.ction, and there is fatually
suffliint evidettcc to support a
finig-tier 1., the *ia4 court, at the
request of either party, may after
notice and hearing and at any time
before the judgment is rendered,
make and file written findings on
such omitted element or elements m
support of the judgment, if the party
aggrieved by the findings has failed
to preserve appellate complaint with
respect to the omitted elements. If
no such written findings are made,
s-teh the omitted elements shall be
deemed found by the court in such
manner as to support the judgment if
such deemed findings are supported
by legally and factually sufficient
evidence. The legal or factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support
express findings made under this rule
may be challenged in the same
manner as challenges to express
findings in nonjury cases. A--eaim
that the evidenee was legally or
fattally insuffieient to warrant th-e
submissiatn of any question may be
made for the first timne after verdict;
regardless of whether the submission
of suchl question was requested by
Disposition: Later in same sentence
Disposition: Second sentence in New
Rule 279(2)
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Source: Language conformed to
Current Rule 299
Source: Second sentence of Current
Rule 279
Source: New; to conform to Tex. R.
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:675
App. P. 52(d)




SUPREME COURT JURY CHARGE TASK
FORCEPROPOSED REVISIONS TO TEX. R. CIV. P. 271-79
[Final Task Force Report (Oct. 19, 1992). as amended by the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee (June 5,1995)]
RULE 271. CHARGE TO THE JURY
Amended Text
.. .. . .... " - 1 .. , _Uness e.x,-reooW wa.i,,ed. by the.
pgrtie Tthe trial court shall prepare
anid in oven .. rt deliver a written
charge to the jury. The court shall
provide counsel with written copies
of the proposed charge, and shall
provide a reasonable opportunity
for the parties to prepare their
requests and objections and to
present them on the record outside
the presence of the jury after the
conclusion of the evidence and
before the charge is read to the jury.
After the requests and objections
are made and ruled upon and any
modifications to the charge are
made, the court shall read the
charge to the jury in open court in
the precise words in which it is
written. The court shall deliver one
or more copies of the written charge
to the jury. The charge shall be






sentence of New Rule 271
Source: Second sentence of
Current Rule 272 and
second sentence of Current
Rule 273
Source: Current Rule 275
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Source: First sentence of Current Rule 271
Source: First sentence of Current Rule 272
RULE 272. REOUISFS STANDARDS FOR THE JURY
CHARGE
Amended Text
th e r  d c ce. ant shall b .b*:-^. 1 + .... . . r -. : ^1 .. + .
reto., of th*e. -. rt - t 1U..
their a. ..s f +or c ,TI1 1. . ,
shal tonexaine an tufficint bile
ti2Lttr v . LI Jie abt.afl .q ShfJl i l
ev ery in tan cc b e presented to th e.'
eo1"- crere in th pes-te te
..th..ri read to thc ry.
oieet ,iosnts rsttdsalb
shall ......... tt* -
beoeredn the ihr tJlllo the ., imril
obietion 41.1 writte or. d1,.....11 .... me
an~d ,the ... ou-:rts rulng .... t ma.... .
be inel1.u.Ied a.. a vart _1
veawl[t and , wh.et ,Jt , t in lud oux
thereon.LIVI it shall¢ be UII orV ~l. * u
less o.Ltherwll Jis olted i ther IJL,,,~lIreee.r-
tha ... . +1 tv .... tt .2" .. . '- *'.. . .
tions+ t+1 es... - th .. . am....e -ft-.--




Disposition [writing]: First sentence
of New Rule 271
Disposition [signed/filed]: Fifth
sentence of New Rule 271
Disposition [record]: Omitted as
unnecessary
Disposition [submitted]: Second
sentence of New Rule 271







Pleading Required. A party
who has the burden of
pleading a matter shall not be
entitled to the submission of a
question, instruction, or
definition regarding that
matter unless the matter is
affirmatively raised by the
party's pleading.
First sentence of New
First sentence of New
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Disposition:
Rule 274(2)
Third sentence of New
Source: Generalization of second
sentence of Current Rule 278
Comment on the Evidence.
The court shall not directly
comment on the weight of the
evidence or advise the jury of
the effect of their answers,
but an otherwise proper
question, instruction, or
definition shall not be
objectionable on the ground
that it incidentally constitutes
a comment on the weight of
the evidence or advises the
jury of the effect of their
answers.
2000]
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Source: Generalization of ninth
sentence of Current Rule 277
Source: Adapted from first sentence
of Current Rule 278
Source: First sentence of Current
Rule 277
Source: Generalization of seventh
sentence of Current Rule 277
Source: Adapted from eighth
sentence of Current Rule 277
Source: Third sentence of Current
Rule 277
Questions.
In General. The court shall
submit questions about the
disputed material factual
issues raised by the pleadings
and the evidence.
Broad Form Submission. The
court shall, whenever feasible,
submit the case by broad form
questions.
Conditional Submission. The
court may predicate the jury's
consideration of one or more
questions upon specified
answers to another question or
questions on which the
materiality of the predicated
question or questions depends.
Disjunctive Submission. The
court may submit a question
disjunctively when the
evidence shows that only one
of the matters inquired about
necessarily exists. A proper





shall not be submitted.
Instructions and Definitions.
In General. The court shall
submit such instructions and
definitions as shall be proper




Source: Fourth sentence of Current Rule 277
RULE 273. JURYV SUBMISIONS, [Revealed]
Amended Text
Either party may present to the
court and request written questions,
definitions, and instructions to be
given to the jury; and the court may
give them or a part thereof, or may
refuse to give them, as may be
proper. Such requests shall be
prepared and presented to the court
and submitted to opposing counsel
for examination and objection
within a reasonable time after the
charge is given to the parties or their
attorneys for examination. A
request by either party for any
questions, definitions, or
instructions shall be made separate
and apart from such party's











RULE 274. OBJECTIONS AND REQJEST,
PRESERVATION OF APPELLATE COMPLAINTS
Amended Text Requests. A party
may not assign as error the failure to
give a question, definition, or in-
struction on a contention which that
party was required to plead unless
the record reflects that, after the
conclusion of the evidence and be-
fore or at the time of objecting, the
party tendered such question, defini-
tion, or instruction to the judge in
writing. Defects in a requested
question, definition, or instruction
shall not constitute a waiver of error
if the request provides the trial court
reasonable guidance in fashioning a
Sources and Dispositions
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correct question, definition, or in-
struction. If a request has been filed
and bears the judge's signature, it
shall be presumed, unless otherwise
noted in the record, that the request
was tendered at the proper time.
Objections. A party may not assign
as error the giving or the failure to
give a question, definition, or
instruction unless that party objects
thereto before the charge is read to
the jury, A party Gb.ting,. a
ehargc must point ut stating
distinctly the objeetianab-e matter
objected to and the grounds of the
objection. An objection must
identify the portion of the charge to
which complaint is made and [be]
specific enough to enable the trial
court to make an informed ruling on
the objection. Objections shall be in
writing or shall be made orally in the
presence of the court, the court
reporter, and opposing counsel. It
shall be presumed, unless otherwise
noted in the record, that a party
making objections did so at the
proper time. Any .m.lain - .
speeiteall y iluded in. thet 1 LI,




Objections or Requests. When
the eaniplaiting partys an
objection; or requested
intuetion is tio. o .
THE JURY CHARGE
Source: Second sentence of Current
Rule 272




First sentence of new
Source: Adapted from fourth
sentence of Current Rule 278






requests, such objection or
request shall be e.....bl. not
preserve appellate complaint.
No objection to one part of the
charge may be adopted and
applied to any other part of the
charge by reference only. A
judgment shall not be reversed
because of the failure of the
court to submit different shades
of the same question,
definition, or instruction.
Rulings. The court shall
announce its rulings on
objections on the record before
reading the charge to the jury.
In the absence of an express
ruling, any objection not cured
by the charge is deemed
overruled.
Source: Fourth sentence of Current
Rule 272
Evidentiary Sufficiency Complaints.
A claim that there is no evidence to
support the submission of a question,
or that the answer to the question is
established as a matter of law, may
be made for the first time after the
verdict. A claim that there is
factually insufficient evidence to
support the jury's answer to a
question, or that the answer to the
question is against the great weight
20001
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and preponderance of the evidence,
may be made only after the verdict.
Such claims may be made regardless
of whether the submison of the
question was requested by the
complainant.
Source: Adapted from fourth
sentence of Current Rule 279
RUL6E 275. CHARGE READ BEFORE ARGUMENT
[Repealed]
Amended Text Sources and Dispositions
............ t ........... i , .. Disposition: Third sentence
trial ...... s----l- ---- - of New Rule 271
the j u ry itt the ci ree words in
wh.ieh/ it, was writte,L .nLdint!'.LI. a.
Stttio0, dfinitions, nI.I.
;-Q~r11P~i"Q U.U t
RULE 276. REFUSAL OR MODIFICA TON IRepealed]
Amended Text
When an instruction, question, or
definition is requested and the
provisions of the law have been
complied with and the trial judge
refuses the same, the judge shall
endorse thereon "Refused," and
sign the same officially. If the trial
judge modifies the same the judge
shall endorse thereon "Modified as
follows: (stating in what particular
the judge has modified the same)
and given, and exception allowed"
and sign the same officially. Such
refused or modified instruction,
question, or definition, when so
endorsed shall constitute a bill of
exceptions, and it shall be
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asking the same presented it at the
proper time, excepted to its refusal
or modification, and that all the
requirements of law have been
observed, and such procedure shall
entitle the party requesting the same
to have the action of the trial judge
thereon reviewed without preparing
a formal bill of exceptions.
Disposition: Requirement repealed
Disposition: Third sentence of
New Rule 274(1), in modified
form
RULE 277. SUBMISSION TO TII-- URY [Repealed]
Amended Text
whenever feasible. submit-the cautse
tivnuboa form,- . questions. The,
.ou.rt shall submit su..h instrutions
Disposition: New Rule 272(2)(e)
Disposition: New Rule 272(3)(b)
inferentia Lll reb uttail otetin shJ IUI lall
rahe than bvl~~ II. ll* inJei t ts io in the%,
Disposition: New Rule 272(2)(b)
Disposition: New Rule 272(3)(a)
ree.mire d.., to appotio the~l il. los
- 1... . IL - ^ 1
-a-II th parties the -- s
st1tutnit£ ald attes.tiaon oE 11q I





Disposition: Omitted as too




J ta been., ml-.tbl. The
Dispositionl Newo isRue 222(ti
anwe the cvdamncc ittion orh
ottLefi ithcoJit ny rut fi
b atho f .t of t r aw r.. ut tth per
the pe~rson, 1 inrd. Titi
Disposition: New Rule 272(2)(c), in
modified form
ut~~ i la xut is apagft
fro th_, ........ .... ... that i t
Dothrostenition: Ne Rul 2723)(c
W REVIEW [Vol. 41:675
Rules of Civil Procedure
Disposition: New Rule
272(2)(d)








instructions and definitions in the
form provided by Rule 277, which
are raised by the written pleadings
and the evidence. Except in trespass
to try title, statutory partition
proceedings, and other special
proceedings in which the pleadings
are specially defined by statutes or
procedural rules, a party shall not be
entitled to any submission of any
question raised only by a general
denial and not raised by affirmative
written pleading by that party.
Nothing herein shall change the
burden of proof from what it would
have been under a general denial. A
judgment shall not be reversed
because of the failure to submit other
and various phases or different
shades of the same question. Failure
to submit a question shall not be
deemed a ground for reversal of the
judgment, unless its submission, in
substantially correct wording, has
been requested in writing and
tendered by the party complaining of
the judgment; provided, however,
that objection to such failure shall
suffice in such respect if the question
is one relied upon by the opposing
party. Failure to submit a definition
or instruction shall not be deemed a
ground for reversal of the judgment
unless a substantially correct
definition or instruction has been
requested in writing and tendered by
the party complaining of the
judgment.
Disposition: New Rules 272(2)(a)
and 272(3)(a)
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
2000]
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Disposition: New Rule 272(1)
Disposition: Omitted as unnecessary
Disposition: Third sentence of New
Rule 274(3)
Disposition: First sentence of
New Rule 274(l), in modified
form
RULE 279. OMISSIONS FROM THE CHARGE
Amended Text
Omission of Entire Ground. Upor
Appe... Any independent grounds
of recovery or of defense which is
not conclusively established under
the evidence and no elem.nt f
whieh is sttbtitted or rcutd all
elements of which are omitted from
the charge without preservation of
appellate complaint by the party
relying thereon fe is waived.
Omission of One or More Elements.
When an independent ground of
recovery or defense consists of more
than one element, if and one or more
of stte the elements necessary to
sustain such ground of recovery or
defense, and necessarily referable
thereto, are is submitted to and
found by the jury, and one or more
of such elements rre is omitted from
the charge,. wit...t i t
obieetio... a ther•e .... l
Sources and Dispositions
8ifietienti evieCIenee toa stippot
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findit-- hereon. the *t4i4 court, at the
request of either party, may after
notice and hearing and at any time
before the judgment is rendered,
make and file written findings on
such omitted element or elements in
v..rt of thle jud.ment. if the party
aggrieved by the findings has failed
to preserve appellate complaint with
respect to the omitted elements. If
no such written findings are made,
ftteh the omitted elements shall be
deemed found by the court in such
manner as to support the judgment if
such deemed findings are supported
by legally and factually sufficient
evidence. The legal or factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support
express findings made under this rule
may be challenged in the same
manner as challenges to express
findings in nonjury cases. A-ebtim
SttbiioofvJ afty c.lue.osief Ma-y u
made for the first timne after verdiet.:
Disposition [in support]: Omitted as
unnecessary
Source: Second sentence of Current
Rule 279
Source: New: to conform to TEx. R.
APP. P. 52(d).
Disposition: New Rule 274(5), in
modified form
SO UTH TEXAS LA W REVIEW
APPENDIX C
SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TEX. R. CIV. P. 271-79,
AS REVISED BY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
May 6, 1996
RULE 271. CHARGE TO THE JURY
The court shall prepare a written charge to the jury. The court shall
provide the parties written copies of the proposed charge and a rea-
sonable opportunity to prepare their requests and objections and to
present them on the record outside the presence of the jury after the
conclusion of the evidence and before the charge is read to the jury.
Alter requests and objections are made and ruled upon and any modi-
fications to the charge are made, and before argument, the judge shall
read the charge to the jury in open court precisely as written. The
court shall deliver a copy of the written charge to each member of the
jury. The charge shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
RULE 277. STANDARDS FOR THE JURY CHARGE
a. General Standards. A party is not entitled to the submission of a
question, instruction or definition regarding a matter that is not af-
firmatively raised by the written pleadings and raised by the evidence.
The court shall not directly comment on the weight of the evidence or
advise the jury of the effect of its answers, but an otherwise proper
question, instruction or definition shall not be objectionable on the
ground that it incidentally comments on the weight of the evidence or
advises the jury of the effect of its answers.
b. Questions. The court shall submit questions about the disputed
material factual issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. The
court shall, whenever feasible, submit the case by broad form ques-
tions. The court may predicate the jury's consideration of one or more
questions upon specified answers to another question or questions on
which the materiality of the predicated question or questions depends.
The court may submit a question disjunctively when the evidence
shows that only one of the matters inquired about necessarily exists. A
proper disjunctive question that submits a defensive theory as an al-
ternative to a claimants theory is not an impermissible inferential re-
[Vol. 41:675
THE JURY CHARGE
buttal submission. However, inferential rebuttal questions shall not
be submitted.
c. Instructions and Definitions. The court shall submit such instruc-
tions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a
verdict. The placing of the burden of proof may be accomplished by
instructions or by inclusion in the questions.
RULE 278. PRESERVATION OF APPELLATE COMPLAINTS
a. Requests. After the close of the evidence and before or at the
time of objecting, or at such earlier time as the court may require, a
party shall submit to the court in writing the questions, definitions and
instructions requested to be included in the charge on any contention
that party was required to plead. The requests must be sufficient to
provide the court reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge. Fail-
ure to comply with this paragraph shall not preclude the party from
assigning error in the charge if an objection is made pursuant to para-
graph
b. Objections. A party may not complain of any error in the charge
unless that party objects thereto before the charge is read to the jury,
stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objec-
tion. An objection must identify that portion of the charge to which
complaint is made and be specific enough to enable the trial court to
make an informed ruling on the objection. Objections shall be in
writing or shall be made orally in the presence of the court, the court
reporter, and opposing counsel. It shall be presumed, unless otherwise
noted in the record, that a party making objections did so at the
proper time.
c. Obscured or Concealed Objections or Requests. When an objec-
tion or request is obscured or concealed by voluminous unfounded
objections or requests, minute differentiations or numerous unneces-
sary objections or requests, such objection or request shall not pre-
serve appellate complaint. No objection to one part of the charge may
be adopted and applied to any other part of the charge by reference
only. A judgment shall not be reversed because of the failure of the
court to submit different shades of the same question, definition, or
instruction.
d. Rulings. The court shall announce its rulings on objections on
2000]
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the record before reading the charge to the jury. In the absence of an
express ruling, any objection not cured by the charge is deemed over-
ruled.
e. Evidentiary Sufficiency Complaints. A claim that there is no evi-
dence to support the submission of a question, or that the answer to
the question is established as a matter of law, may be made for the
first time after the verdict. A claim that there is factually insufficient
evidence to support the jury's answer to a question, or that the answer
to a question is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence, may be made only after the verdict. Such claims may be
made regardless of whether the submission of the question was re-
quested by the complainant.
Notes and Comments
Comment to 1996 change: Paragraph (a) provides that "failure to
comply with this rule shall not preclude the party from assigning error
in the charge if an objection is made pursuant to paragraph (b),' but
the court rfiay sanction a party who fails to comply with the rule.
RULE 279. OMISSIONS FROM THE CHARGE
a. Omission of Entire Ground. Any independent ground of recov-
ery or defense which is not conclusively established under the evi-
dence and all elements of which are omitted from the charge without
preservation of appellate complaint by the party relying thereon is
waived.
b. Omission of One or More Elements. When an independent
ground of recovery or defense consists of more than one element, and
one or more of the e elements necessary to sustain such ground of re-
covery or defense, and necessarily referable thereto, is submitted to
and found by the jury, and one or more of such elements is omitted
from the charge, the court, at the request of either party, may after
notice and hearing and at any time before the judgment is rendered,
make and file written findings on such omitted element or elements, if
the party aggrieved by the findings has failed to preserve appellate
complaint with respect to the omitted elements. If no such written
findings are made, the omitted elements shall be deemed found by the
court in such manner as to support the judgment if such deemed
findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
[Vol. 41:675
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The legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support express
findings made under this rule may be challenged in the same manner
as challenges to express findings in nonjury cases.
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX D
SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S SUGGESTED
CHANGE TO TEX. R. CIV. P. 278, SUBMITTED TO THE
TEXAS SUPREME COURT
May 27, 1996
RULE 278. PRESERVATION OF APPELLATE COMPLAINTS
(a) Requests. After the close of the evidence and before or at the time
of objecting, or at such earlier time as the court may require, a party
shall submit to the court in writing the questions, definitions and in-
structions requested to be included in the charge on any contention
that party was required to plead. The requests must be sufficient to
provide the court reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge. Fail-
ure to comply with this paragraph shall not preclude the party from
assigning error in the charge if an objection which gives the court rea-
sonable guidance is made pursuant to paragraph (b).
(b) Objections. A party may not complain of any error in the charge
unless that party objects thereto before the charge is read to the jury,
stating distinctly the matter objection to and the grounds of the objec-
tion. An objection must identify that portion of the charge to which
complaint is made and be specific enough to enable the trial court to
make an informed ruling on the objection. Objections shall be in
writing or shall be made orally in the presence of the court, the court
reporter, and opposing counsel. It shall be presumed, unless otherwise
noted in the record, that a party making objections did so at the
proper time.
(c) Obscured or Concealed Objections or Requests. When an objec-
tion or request is obscured or concealed by voluminous unfounded
objections or requests, minute differentiations or numerous unneces-
sary objections or requests , such objection or request shall not pre-
serve appellate complaint. No objection to one part of the charge may
be adopted and applied to any other part of the charge by reference
only. A judgment shall not be reversed because of the failure of the
court to submit different shades of the same question, definition, or
instruction.
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(d) Rulings. The court shall announce its rulings on objections on the
record before reading the charge to the jury. In the absence of an ex-
press ruling, any objection not cured by the charge is deemed over-
ruled.
(e) Evidentiary Sufficiency Complaints. A claim that there is no evi-
dence to support the submission of a question, or that the answer to
the question is established as a matter of law, may be made for the
first time after the verdict. A claim that there is factually insufficient
evidence to support the jury's answer to a question, or that the answer
to a question is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence, may be made only after the verdict. Such claims may be
made regardless of whether the submission of the question was re-
quested by the complainant.
[version reported back to the Court by SCAC]
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX E
RECODIFICATION DRAFT SECTION 7 (C) THE JURY
CHARGE, PROPOSED RULES 81-84
December 1997
RULE 81. CHARGE TO THE JURY
The court must prepare a written charge to the jury. The court must
provide the parties written copies of the proposed charge and a rea-
sonable opportunity to prepare their requests and objections and to
present them on the record outside the presence of the jury after the
conclusion of the evidence and before the charge is read to the jury.
After requests and objections are made and ruled upon and any modi-
fications to the charge are made, and before argument, the judge must
read the charge to the jury in open court precisely as written. The
court must deliver a copy of the written charge to each member of the
jury. The charge must be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
[Current Rule: 271, 272 and 275].
RULE 82. STANDARDS FOR THE JURY CHARGE
(a) General Standards. A party is not entitled to the submission of a
question, instruction or definition regarding a matter that is not af-
firmatively raised by the written pleadings and raised by the evidence.
The court must not directly comment on the weight of the evidence or
advise the jury of the effect of its answers, but an otherwise proper
question, instruction or definition will not be objectionable on the
ground that it incidentally comments on the weight of the evidence or
advises the jury of the effect of its answers.
(b) Questions. The court must submit questions about the disputed
material factual issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. The
court must, whenever feasible, submit the case by broad form ques-
tions. The court may predicate the jury's consideration of one or
more questions upon specified answers to another question or ques-
tions on which the materiality of the predicated question or questions
depends. The court may submit a question disjunctively when the
evidence shows that only one of the matters inquired about necessar-
ily exists. A proper disjunctive question that submits a defensive the-
ory as an alternative to a claimant's theory is not an impermissible in-
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ferential rebuttal submission. However, inferential rebuttal questions
must not be submitted.
(c) Instructions and Definitions. The court must submit such instruc-
tions and definitions as are proper to enable the jury to render a ver-
dict. The placing of the burden of proof may be accomplished by in-
structions or by inclusion in the questions.
[Current Rule: 273 and 277].
RULE 83. PRESERVATION OF CHARGE COMPLAINTS
(a) Requests. After the close of the evidence and before or at the
time of objecting, or at such earlier time as the court may require, a
party must submit to the court in writing the questions, definitions and
instructions requested to be included in the charge on any contention
that party was required to plead. The requests must be sufficient to
provide the court reasonable guidance in fashioning the charge. Fail-
ure to comply with this paragraph will not preclude the party from as-
signing error in the charge if an objection which gives the court rea-
sonable guidance is made pursuant to paragraph (b).
(b) Objections. A party may not complain of any error in the charge
unless that party objects thereto before the charge is read to the jury,
stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objec-
tion. An objection must identify that portion of the charge to which
complaint is made and be specific enough to enable the trial court to
make an informed ruling on the objection. Objections must be in
writing or must be made orally in the presence of the court, the court
reporter, and opposing counsel. It must be presumed, unless other-
wise noted in the record, that a party making objections did so at the
proper time.
(c) Obscured or Concealed Objections or Requests. When an objec-
tion or request is obscured or concealed by voluminous unfounded
objections or requests, minute differentiations or numerous unneces-
sary objections or requests, such objection or request will not preserve
appellate complaint. No objection to one part of the charge may be
adopted and applied to any other part of the charge by reference only.
A judgment must not be reversed because of the failure of the court to
submit different shades of the same question, definition, or instruc-
tion.
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(d) Rulings. The court must announce its rulings on objections on
the record before reading the charge to the jury. In the absence of an
express ruling, any objection not cured by the charge is deemed over-
ruled.
(e) Evidentiary Sufficiency Complaints. A claim that there is no evi-
dence to support the submission of a question, or that the answer to
the question is established as a matter of law, may be made for the
first time after the verdict. A claim that there is factually insufficient
evidence to support the jury's answer to a question, or that the answer
to a question is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence, may be made only after the verdict. Such claims may be
made regardless of whether the submission of the question was re-
quested by the complainant.
[Current Rule: 274, 276, 278].
RULE 84. OMISSIONS FROM THE CHARGE
(a) Omission of Entire Ground. Any independent ground of recov-
ery or defense which is not conclusively established under the evi-
dence and all elements of which are omitted from the charge without
preservation of appellate complaint by the party relying thereon is
waived.
(b) Omission of One or More Elements. When an independent
ground of recovery or defense consists of more than one element, and
one or more of the elements necessary to sustain such ground of re-
covery or defense, and necessarily referable thereto, is submitted to
and found by the jury, and one or more of such elements is omitted
from the charge, the court, at the request of either party, may after
notice and hearing and at any time before the judgment is rendered,
make and file written findings on such omitted element or elements, if
the party aggrieved by the findings has failed to preserve appellate
complaint with respect to the omitted elements. If no such written
findings are made, the omitted elements must be deemed found by the
court in such manner as to support the judgment if such deemed
findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
The legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support express
findings made under this rule may be challenged in the same manner
as challenges to express findings in nonjury cases.
[Current Rule: 279].
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